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Rachel Greenstadt:
pressure on or from ISPs

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would make it difficult or impossible
to run an exit relay

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however the third point is the one that
I'm gonna mostly be talking about today:

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Tor is not very useful if you can't
actually use it to get anywhere

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and there is an increasing number of
prominent sites on the internet

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that are restricting what you
can do through Tor

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and in some cases Tor is outright blocked

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and in other cases you're slowed down
by CAPTCHAs and other ways

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to sort of make it annoying to visit

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so a brief overview of my talk

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I'm gonna give a little bit of
background on Tor

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and discuss how it's being blocked by
internet services today

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then I'm gonna talk about Wikipedia

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which is a service or a website,
you may have heard of it

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*laughing*

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that makes it difficult to edit
through Tor

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and I'm gonna talk about their
relationship

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and then I'm gonna discuss some of the
findings that we have

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from our interview-study of Tor users
and Wikipedians.

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So here is some examples of some things
that you might see

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when you are browsing with Tor these days.

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Now, it's worth pointing out that a lot of
these are not individual sites

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but rather content distribution networks,
like Cloudflare and Akamai

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or they're hosting providers like Bluehost
or anti-spam-block-plugins

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that sort of affects a huge, sort of swath
of sites on the internet, not just one.

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There are some individual sites

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say like Yelp, that provide their
own blocking

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but they tend to be somewhat
important sites

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So before I go any further

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I should probably disclose that I'm not
exactly a neutral party here

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I'm married to Roger Dingledine

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who is one of the founders
of the Tor project

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This work is part of a recent experiment
of mine, doing research related to Tor

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while remaining happily married

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so far so good!

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furthermore, this work uses qualitative
ethnographic methods

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which is a bit of a departure from the
machine learning work that I usually do

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mitigating both of these factor is my
wonderful co-author, Andrea Forte

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who is trained in ethnographic methods

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and conducted all of the interview that
I'm going to talk to you about

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So, when I was talking to Roger about this
talk, he said

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most people at CCC will have heard of Tor
by now

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I think that's probably true,
and they'll be aware that

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and they'll be aware that it hides something
about you when you're browsing the Internet

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but, they might be a bit fuzzy on some of
the details, so: very quick recap

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When Alice starts up Tor, her client
starts by fetching a list of relays

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from the directory server.

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Then, the Tor client is gonna pick a
three-hop path to the destination server.

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Hop 1 is gonna know who you are
but not where you're going.

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Then Hop 3 knows where you're going
but not who you are.

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Now there is a link encrypted
from you to hop 3,

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and then hop 3,
which is the exit relay,

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actually delivers your
request to a website.

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Now this part is not encrypted by Tor
and as far as the website is concerned,

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it is actually delivering a request from
the user at the exit relay

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usually when Tor users receive the
blocking screens that I've showed earlier

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it's because the website is blocking
the exit relay's IP address

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so this can happen either because the site
is deliberately blocking tor

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by downloading the directory and blocking
all of the Tor exit IP's

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or because someone did something
unpleasant

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through that exit relay in the past

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and it was put on a blocklist incidentally

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So there's been some research on this
phenomenon

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and here's some cutting-edge research that
hasn't actually even been presented yet

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it's going to be published in the NDSS
conference in February

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by the people up here

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and it's looking sort of quantitatively
about how prevalent

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this blocking problem is.

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We found that of the top 1000 Alexa
sites, 3.5% of them were actually blocked

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for Tor users.

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You can see on this list on the right:
most of the blocking is due to

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aggregate blockers like these hosting
companies and CDNs

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it's also the case that most of the sites

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didn't actually
block 100% of the exit nodes

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But the bigger the exit is bandwidth wise

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thus the higher probability to be
exiting from it

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the more likely it was to be blocked

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so this graph shows of 2000 block sites
from Ooni data

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given the exit node and how probable
it was

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that that exit node would be blocked.

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So one website that blocks Tor users
is Wikipedia

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Now Wikipedia doesn't actually Tor users
from reading Wikipedia

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which is very useful because it's a
resource that's important

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for lots of people to be able to reach,
sometimes anonymously

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but it does prevent them from editing.

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That's true even if they're logged in.

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So according to Wikipedia,
Wikipedia is a free access,

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free content Internet encyclopedia
supported and hosted by the

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non-profit Wikimedia Foundation

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Those who can access this site can
edit most of its articles

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and Wikipedia is ranked among the ten most
popular websites

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and constitutes the Internet's largest and
most popular general reference work

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So right now, y'know, from our vantage
point eight years...

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since this quote in 2007
in probably about...

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I'm not actually sure when Wikipedia was
founded, but some years after

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it's hard to realize what a radical idea
Wikipedia once was

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this encyclopedia that can be edited by,
well, almost anyone

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in 2007 the New York Times said:

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"The problem with WIkipedia is that it
only works in practice.

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In theory, it can never work."

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There's some sort of miracle,
that Wikipedia manages to be

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the resource it is, and it's the sort of
thing that researchers

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and economists have tried to explain

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and they've tried to explain it in the
same way they explain

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the Linux kernel

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this thing happens and nobody quite knows
why

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and it makes Wikipedians today a little
nervous about and conservative perhaps

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about anything that could rock the boat,
affect the quality of the encyclopedia

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but the fact is that Wikipedia needs its
contributors to continue to

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update, expand and improve the resource

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Wikipedia contributions peaked in 2007 and
have been in a slow and steady decline

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so this graph above shows the number of
active registered editors

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who've edited more than 5 edits per month
as plotted over time

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and you can see this peak that happens
in 2007

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the reasons behind this decline are
actually an active area of research

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in their area of concern for the
Wikimedia foundation and so on

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the upshot of it is that Wikipedia can't
exactly afford to

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just throw away good editors.

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Aside from the general decline in
participation

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there's Wikipedia's sort of demographic
imbalance

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Wikipedia editors are 84-91% male

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depending on how you count

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and there is also a lot of
under-representation

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from global south countries

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and there's been a little bit of research
to show how this affects the quality

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of the encyclopedia.

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There's a group of researchers from the
?Groveland's? group at

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the university of Minnesota
and they were interested in this question

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they had access to a database of movie-
ratings and the gender of the raters

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so they compared the length of articles
about movies that were

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disproportionately rated by men or women
while controlling for the popularity

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and the rating of the movie

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and in this case they showed that
male-skewing movies

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had articles that were much longer than
articles about female-skewing movies

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independent of these popularity and
rating effects.

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Now, maybe articles about movies, it's
kind of a trivial thing,

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but it kind of shows you that the editor
population affects article categories

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that might be harder to measure
in such a rigorous way.

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it made us wonder how the absence of
Tor user editors

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affects the quality of the encyclopedia

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and if there's a similar skew that you
might be able to see.

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To help understand and answer this
question, it's worth asking

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what a Wikipedian would
get out of using Tor.

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This question is actually one that has
people kind of confused because

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a lot of people see Tor as a tool that you
use to hide who you are to a website

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and basically no one at Wikipedia is at
all interested

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in letting Tor users Wikipedia without
logging in at all.

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However Tor provides some benefits to
users, even when they're logged in

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and thus not hiding from Wikipedia.

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In particular it protects against certain
surveillance by your local ISP

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or administrative domain, and it can also
protect against government surveillance.

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Furthermore it prevents your IP-address
from being stored

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in the Wikipedia database of user IPs that
can be accessed by administrators

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and attackers.

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We've all seen plenty of cases where
attackers get access

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to databases they're not supposed to.

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Another property that is probably more
easy to think about is reachability.

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Internet connections could be censored,
and Tor might be the only method of

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actually accessing Wikipedia.

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And lastly a lot of Tor users use Tor for
all of their Internet use

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as a mechanism to diversify the user base
and provide cover for and solidarity with

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users that might need Tor for a
different purpose.

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So participation in Internet projects and
open source projects can be dangerous.

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Consider the case of Bassel Khartabil

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who's a well-known Wikipedia editor,
open source software developer

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and the founder of Creative Commons Syria.

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He was jailed for three years and he's now
disappeared, a lot of people think he's dead

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he's very well known for having founded
the New Palmyra project

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which uses satellite and high-resolution
imagery to create open 3d models

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of ancient structures.

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Now these structures were raided by Daesh,
sometimes called ISIS, some time in 2015

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and so this work that he's done is our
best record of these structures

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that now exist.

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In another case, Jimmy Wales announced in
2015 that the Wikipedian of the year could

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not be revealed publicly, because to do so
would actually put the person in danger.

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So, the Wikimedia foundation is also
aware that there are some cases

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where editors need privacy.

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So then, with all these risks, that
Wikipedians face, and the benefits

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that Tor can provide,
why would it be blocked?

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Well, it comes down to abuse.

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The problem of jerks is a real problem
on the Internet.

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Though the research is somewhat ambiguous
as to the degree at which it's actually

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made worse by anonymity,

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there's this very popular theory on the
Internet that if you take a normal person

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and anonymity and an audience,
they become a total dickwad.

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Nonetheless, managing abuse is actually
somewhat harder

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with anonymous participants, and there's
certainly this perception that

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anonymity can make people more
susceptible to abusive behavior.

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Fortunately the cryptographic
research community has studied

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how to reconcile anonymity and
blacklisting of users

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and has found some pretty promising
solutions.

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The first, which I'll discuss briefly here
is Apu Kapadia's Nymble design.

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There have been many variants of this,
including Nymbler, ?Jackbenable?, Jack,

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you get the idea.

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Basically when Alice wants to contribute
anonymously to a website or a project

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she uses a pseudonym server to get
a pseudonym.

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Then she gives that 'nym to a
nym-manager

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and that nym-manager
gives her a ticket.

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That ticket is then used to connect to the
site she wants to participate on,

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so it's another way to sort of distribute
the trust.

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But our Alice is a jerk, so
she vandalizes the website.

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The website then complains to the Nymble
manager which will then send the server

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a token that can be used to link that user
in the future.

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The server then adds the user to a
blacklist.

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So basically the way that this works is
that everything the user has done

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before the complaint still remains
anonymous forever,

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but everything that they do in the future
is linkable

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and thus it remains easier to block them.

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There has basically been no adoption of
this kind of protocol,

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despite a lot of iterations in the
literature.

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There are some reasons for this:

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many of the variants have no
implementation, and those that do

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it's research code and as the author
of some research code...

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I can tell you that there would be
significant work involved in

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actually adopting these measures.

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And there is a price to be paid. You have
pick between either having

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a semi-trusted third party, degraded
notions of privacy,

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so basically pseudonymity
rather than anonymity,

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or high computational overhead

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because zero-knowledge proofs are
still kind of expensive.

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But it could well be done, and it's not
like you need all of these things,

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you only need one,

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but ultimately it isn't being done, and I
think this is because most sites

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don't really care. They believe that the
number of non-jerks might not be zero,

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but it's approximately zero,
and it's just not worth the bother.

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So we're interested in measuring this
value of anonymous participation

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to sort of provide motivation for sites to
actually try and solve these problems.

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It's not a terribly easy thing to do,
because Tor is blocked so often

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we're actually trying to measure
participation that doesn't happen,

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that might happen under
alternate circumstances.

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To ask this question we turned to
qualitative methods, which is

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basically an interview study.

233
00:15:53,020 --> 00:15:56,429
We talked to Tor users who participate in
open collaboration, and we talked to

234
00:15:56,429 --> 00:15:58,990
Wikipedia editors about their privacy
concerns.

235
00:16:01,510 --> 00:16:03,649
So we have two basic research questions:

236
00:16:03,649 --> 00:16:05,839
first, what kind of threats do
contributors

237
00:16:05,839 --> 00:16:09,899
to open collaboration projects perceive,
and second:

238
00:16:09,899 --> 00:16:13,850
how do people who contribute to open
collaboration projects manage the risk?

239
00:16:13,850 --> 00:16:16,990
The goal here is to get the kind of
in-depth and qualitative

240
00:16:16,990 --> 00:16:19,490
understanding that will help us to ask
the right questions

241
00:16:19,490 --> 00:16:23,000
in a larger scale study, and ensure that
we're solving the right problems

242
00:16:23,000 --> 00:16:28,069
when we design systems to facilitate
anonymous participation in online projects

243
00:16:29,219 --> 00:16:30,970
As ?Cera McDonald? Pikelet said:

244
00:16:30,970 --> 00:16:36,470
"They're not anecdotes, that's small
batch artisanal data..."

245
00:16:38,320 --> 00:16:42,730
So a little bit about our 23 participants
in our study

246
00:16:42,730 --> 00:16:45,339
We had 12 participants that were Tor users

247
00:16:45,339 --> 00:16:50,640
8 males, 3 females and 1 of fluid gender.

248
00:16:50,640 --> 00:16:55,410
The minimum age was 18, the maximum age
was 41 and the average was 30.

249
00:16:55,410 --> 00:17:01,020
3 people with a high school education, 4
current and graduated undergraduates

250
00:17:01,020 --> 00:17:07,048
and 5 people with post-graduate degrees or
who were graduate students.

251
00:17:08,398 --> 00:17:13,279
The location: 7 of the participants were
from the U.S. but we also had

252
00:17:13,279 --> 00:17:18,699
participants from Australia, Belgium,
Canada, South Africa and Sweden.

253
00:17:18,959 --> 00:17:26,169
For the Wikimedia participants, we had
again 8 males and 3 females.

254
00:17:26,169 --> 00:17:31,649
Actually I think the demographics of Tor
and Wikimedia might not be too different.

255
00:17:31,649 --> 00:17:37,159
The minimum age was 20 and the max was 53,
again the average was 30.

256
00:17:37,159 --> 00:17:42,360
One didn't report their education level,
we had 8 people with bachelor's degrees

257
00:17:42,360 --> 00:17:47,330
or undergraduate students, and 2 graduate
students or people with graduate degrees.

258
00:17:47,330 --> 00:17:51,620
Again we had 5 participants from the U.S.,
but we also had participants from

259
00:17:51,620 --> 00:17:56,309
Australia, France, Ghana, Israel
and the U.K. in this case.

260
00:17:56,309 --> 00:18:00,740
So we didn't have - a lot of people talked
to us - we didn't have any participants

261
00:18:00,740 --> 00:18:05,559
from places like Iran or China, though we
did have some Iranians who were

262
00:18:05,559 --> 00:18:08,520
living in the U.S. who talked to us.

263
00:18:08,520 --> 00:18:12,230
So types of participation

264
00:18:12,230 --> 00:18:15,489
Obviously we had Wikipedians,
we sought them out

265
00:18:15,489 --> 00:18:18,440
a number of the people that we talked
to, especially the Tor users

266
00:18:18,440 --> 00:18:21,310
who actually contribute to
the Tor project in some way

267
00:18:21,310 --> 00:18:24,559
but we asked people about their other
participation on the Internet,

268
00:18:24,559 --> 00:18:28,300
especially Tor users, and we found that
there are a lot of people that participate

269
00:18:28,300 --> 00:18:34,000
through adding web comments, participating
on forums, using Twitter...

270
00:18:34,000 --> 00:18:37,740
contributing open source code to projects
on Github or Sourceforge

271
00:18:37,740 --> 00:18:40,850
or other projects on the Internet, helping
with the Internet archive

272
00:18:40,850 --> 00:18:46,100
or contributing to image boards...
to sites that do that.

273
00:18:46,100 --> 00:18:50,120
So our interview protocol: we gave 20
dollars in compensation,

274
00:18:50,120 --> 00:18:51,480
gift cards or cash.

275
00:18:51,480 --> 00:18:58,200
30% of people declined this because we
would need to register their participation

276
00:18:58,200 --> 00:19:02,809
if we give them compensation, and some
people didn't want there to be

277
00:19:02,809 --> 00:19:03,980
as much of a record.

278
00:19:03,980 --> 00:19:07,509
We spoke to people over the phone, using
Skype, using

279
00:19:07,509 --> 00:19:11,809
various encrypted audio mechanisms,
one person was interviewed face to face.

280
00:19:11,809 --> 00:19:14,669
The interviews were again conducted by
Andrea Forte

281
00:19:14,669 --> 00:19:19,260
and we asked people to tell in-depth
stories and prompted them for detail.

282
00:19:19,690 --> 00:19:23,630
Our analysis of this is ongoing, it's
not done,

283
00:19:24,310 --> 00:19:28,319
we've transcribed all the interviews,
we've coded them to identify the themes

284
00:19:28,319 --> 00:19:30,480
and we grouped and merged some of these
themes.

285
00:19:30,480 --> 00:19:34,009
I'm going to talk to you about some of the
stuff that came out of this study,

286
00:19:34,009 --> 00:19:37,009
give some quotes and things like that.

287
00:19:37,579 --> 00:19:38,520
Interview topics.

288
00:19:38,520 --> 00:19:42,299
For Tor users we asked them to explain Tor
and what it's for. We asked for some

289
00:19:42,299 --> 00:19:44,879
current and retrospective examples of use,

290
00:19:44,879 --> 00:19:48,169
the story of how and why they first
started using Tor,

291
00:19:48,169 --> 00:19:52,139
and some examples of when they use Tor
online and when they don't use Tor online

292
00:19:52,139 --> 00:19:55,489
and some questions about their
participation in online projects

293
00:19:55,489 --> 00:19:59,480
and if they participate in Wikipedia we
asked them some of the Wikipedia questions

294
00:19:59,480 --> 00:20:02,249
similarly with Wikipedia people who had
used Tor.

295
00:20:02,249 --> 00:20:05,560
And there was some considerable overlap.

296
00:20:06,590 --> 00:20:09,640
For Wikipedians we asked how and why they
started editing,

297
00:20:09,640 --> 00:20:12,289
examples of privacy concerns associated
with their editing,

298
00:20:12,289 --> 00:20:15,169
steps they may have taken to protect their
privacy when editing,

299
00:20:15,169 --> 00:20:18,450
and examples of interactions with other
editors.

300
00:20:18,820 --> 00:20:24,170
Now, there's some real limitations with
this work:

301
00:20:24,450 --> 00:20:28,210
we may be missing participants with severe
privacy concerns.

302
00:20:28,940 --> 00:20:32,519
Anybody who participate in this would have
talk to unknown parties

303
00:20:32,519 --> 00:20:36,700
that they couldn't necessarily trust that
we were not going to do

304
00:20:36,700 --> 00:20:40,199
any nefarious things with their interview.

305
00:20:40,279 --> 00:20:43,769
They need to speak remotely over a
communications channel in most cases

306
00:20:43,769 --> 00:20:48,909
we were willing to conduct some interviews
over various encrypted channels

307
00:20:48,909 --> 00:20:51,950
such as Jitsi or really whatever people
wanted us to do,

308
00:20:51,950 --> 00:20:53,519
as long as we could set it up.

309
00:20:53,519 --> 00:20:56,500
Though we didn't mention Skype in our
recruitment materials,

310
00:20:56,500 --> 00:20:59,899
and this actually caused a bit of a
kerfuffle on the Tor blog

311
00:20:59,899 --> 00:21:04,700
when people were saying we clearly don't
understand Tor

312
00:21:04,700 --> 00:21:08,399
and have no familiarity with the project
if we're even thinking of using Skype

313
00:21:08,399 --> 00:21:14,099
I know a couple of Tor users and Tor
developers that use Skype, so...

314
00:21:14,179 --> 00:21:17,809
but, y'know, we were willing to
use other things,

315
00:21:17,809 --> 00:21:20,700
and we again didn't talk to residents of
Iran or China,

316
00:21:20,700 --> 00:21:25,319
which is something that a lot of people
told us might be of interest.

317
00:21:25,319 --> 00:21:28,459
So, what does anonymity actually mean to a

318
00:21:28,459 --> 00:21:32,040
Wikipedian, was an interesting question.
Because it doesn't mean the same thing

319
00:21:32,040 --> 00:21:36,999
that it usually means to a Tor user. So,
a lot of times when people talk about

320
00:21:36,999 --> 00:21:40,440
anonymous edits in Wikipedia they mean
editing without logging in.

321
00:21:40,440 --> 00:21:45,649
And this is actually called IP editing to
Wikipedians, because what happens when you

322
00:21:45,649 --> 00:21:50,820
edit Wikipedia without logging in is that
the IP address is actually published

323
00:21:50,820 --> 00:21:53,409
as the author of that edit.

324
00:21:53,409 --> 00:21:57,450
The other thing that people mean when
they talk about editing anonymously is

325
00:21:57,450 --> 00:22:01,399
editing under a synonymous account while
not leaving clues about your identity.

326
00:22:03,300 --> 00:22:06,250
The notion of IP editing is somewhat
problematic.

327
00:22:06,500 --> 00:22:10,289
This was an article from Buzzfeed about

328
00:22:10,289 --> 00:22:15,879
the 33 most embarassing congressional
edits to member's Wikipedia pages.

329
00:22:15,879 --> 00:22:20,960
The congressional offices in the U.S. all
share one IP address,

330
00:22:20,960 --> 00:22:24,200
so you can simply search Wikipedia for
that IP address

331
00:22:24,200 --> 00:22:26,980
and you can find people making revisions,

332
00:22:26,980 --> 00:22:32,379
for example to the liberty caucus
Wikipedia site and so on.

333
00:22:34,259 --> 00:22:39,659
So in terms of content-based anonymity,
according to the Wikipedians we talked to,

334
00:22:39,659 --> 00:22:42,490
most deanonymisation is done actually by
contextual clues.

335
00:22:42,490 --> 00:22:45,779
When people are outed as being this
pseudonymous Wikipedia person,

336
00:22:45,779 --> 00:22:48,229
it's usually because somebody
looked up things.

337
00:22:48,229 --> 00:22:49,960
There was a quote, someone said:

338
00:22:49,960 --> 00:22:53,590
"these is small things but I usually
wouldn't edit things relating to my school

339
00:22:53,590 --> 00:22:55,909
or places near where I lived
when I was logged in.

340
00:22:55,909 --> 00:22:58,720
It's actually weirdly easy to piece
together someone's identity

341
00:22:58,720 --> 00:23:01,220
based on the location or things like that"

342
00:23:01,220 --> 00:23:04,279
So Tor, it's worth pointing out the limits
of what Tor can do

343
00:23:04,279 --> 00:23:07,920
Tor is not gonna help with this particular
problem

344
00:23:07,920 --> 00:23:09,320
it will hide your IP address

345
00:23:09,320 --> 00:23:13,850
but not necessarily this.

346
00:23:16,310 --> 00:23:19,070
What is the Wikipedia policy on Tor?

347
00:23:19,070 --> 00:23:23,590
Mediawiki has a TorBlock extension, which
automatically blocks editing through Tor

348
00:23:23,590 --> 00:23:27,570
Now, it's possible to actually get an
exemption,

349
00:23:27,570 --> 00:23:31,970
what is called an IP block exemption, and
registered users in good standing

350
00:23:31,970 --> 00:23:33,559
can ask for one.

351
00:23:33,559 --> 00:23:36,789
The problem is, it's a little bit hard to
establish that standing

352
00:23:36,789 --> 00:23:41,249
it requires editing without using Tor.

353
00:23:41,739 --> 00:23:49,159
When pointed out that this is particularly
problematic for censored users,

354
00:23:49,159 --> 00:23:52,279
because they can't access Wikipedia to
edit in the first place,

355
00:23:52,279 --> 00:23:56,720
although they do provide some closed
proxies for Chinese users in particular,

356
00:23:56,720 --> 00:24:00,309
there are a lot of censored users that
aren't Chinese but...

357
00:24:00,309 --> 00:24:04,499
you can contact them to ask to use their
sort of secret proxies.

358
00:24:04,499 --> 00:24:06,909
I don't know how well this actually works.

359
00:24:06,909 --> 00:24:11,700
But we did ask our interviewees, can
Wikipedia be edited through Tor?

360
00:24:11,700 --> 00:24:15,649
Which is an interesting question. So,
as a convention for the rest of the talk

361
00:24:15,649 --> 00:24:19,109
when you see these blue boxes, they are
gonna be quotes from Wikipedians,

362
00:24:19,109 --> 00:24:22,009
when you see the green boxes, they're
quotes from Tor users.

363
00:24:22,009 --> 00:24:27,400
When we asked people, the WIkipedians
often said: if the account exists,

364
00:24:27,400 --> 00:24:31,019
yes, when you're doing an anonymous edit
with Tor it's really difficult

365
00:24:31,969 --> 00:24:34,450
they mean an IP edit there.
And then he said:

366
00:24:34,450 --> 00:24:36,469
I had one that came
through the mailing list

367
00:24:36,469 --> 00:24:39,289
in the last couple of weeks, and that
their employer had been

368
00:24:39,289 --> 00:24:41,700
checking up on them... we allowed that.

369
00:24:41,700 --> 00:24:45,349
So as an administrator I have a user bot
that allows me to get around that,

370
00:24:45,349 --> 00:24:49,459
but as well as feeling bad about that,
other people don't have that option.

371
00:24:50,759 --> 00:24:55,440
From a Tor user, we actually said: but
sometimes, like every so many exit nodes,

372
00:24:55,440 --> 00:24:57,999
you sometimes one have works...
so many sites block Tor,

373
00:24:57,999 --> 00:25:01,259
try to block it, it's quite annoying as
you're trying to do something.

374
00:25:01,259 --> 00:25:05,969
So this person sort of... saw what... in
the research of blocking Tor,

375
00:25:05,969 --> 00:25:09,419
not every exit node is blocked, so if
you're really determined to make that

376
00:25:09,419 --> 00:25:15,389
anonymous edit, you can just keep clicking
'New Identity' and get there.

377
00:25:16,359 --> 00:25:20,130
And then they said: we do sometimes let
people edit through them,

378
00:25:20,130 --> 00:25:23,139
I know we have users in China coming
through the Great Firewall

379
00:25:23,139 --> 00:25:25,139
and stuff like that.

380
00:25:25,249 --> 00:25:29,179
So then ...
[[ audio cuts out for 4 seconds ]]

381
00:25:29,179 --> 00:25:35,820
Tor user, y'know, well they...
[[ audio cuts out for 16 seconds ]]

382
00:25:35,820 --> 00:25:55,070
[[ audio cuts out for 16 seconds ]]

383
00:25:55,070 --> 00:25:59,670
[[ 5 seconds audio cut remaining ]]

384
00:25:59,670 --> 00:26:01,099
...things like that.

385
00:26:01,099 --> 00:26:04,340
So because you can change your IP address
with the click of a button,

386
00:26:04,340 --> 00:26:07,910
it's very difficult to prevent abuse.

387
00:26:09,110 --> 00:26:14,189
There's this sort of notion that maybe
it's important for vandalism,

388
00:26:14,189 --> 00:26:17,789
but maybe that's a problem, and maybe
there should be something that be done.

389
00:26:17,789 --> 00:26:20,799
So then, a lot of what asked people about
was sort of the threats

390
00:26:20,799 --> 00:26:23,779
that they were concerned about, from a
data privacy perspective.

391
00:26:23,779 --> 00:26:27,899
People talked about government threats,
businesses, organized crime,

392
00:26:27,899 --> 00:26:32,579
private citizens, other project members,
and project outsiders.

393
00:26:32,759 --> 00:26:38,179
When we group the threats, we found sort
of five or so big threats

394
00:26:38,179 --> 00:26:41,940
that lots of people talked about, we had
twelve different instances of

395
00:26:41,940 --> 00:26:45,389
people talking about surveillance concerns
or general concerns about

396
00:26:45,389 --> 00:26:47,739
the loss of privacy.

397
00:26:47,739 --> 00:26:50,969
Ten people talked specifically about the
loss of employment

398
00:26:50,969 --> 00:26:55,979
or economic opportunity that might happen,
9 people talked about bullying,

399
00:26:55,979 --> 00:26:59,700
harassment, intimidation, stalking,
this sort of thing.

400
00:26:59,760 --> 00:27:04,429
Another 9 people talked about personal
safety, or the safety of their loved ones.

401
00:27:04,429 --> 00:27:10,100
6 people that we talked to, talked about
reputation loss.

402
00:27:10,100 --> 00:27:12,909
I'll get into these in more detail.

403
00:27:13,309 --> 00:27:14,679
Surveillance.

404
00:27:14,679 --> 00:27:18,090
Y'know, in my country there is basically
unknown surveillance going on

405
00:27:18,090 --> 00:27:21,369
and I don't know what providers to use,
and at some point I decided to

406
00:27:21,369 --> 00:27:22,619
use Tor for everything.

407
00:27:22,619 --> 00:27:25,919
It's worth pointing out given the list of
countries I gave that

408
00:27:25,919 --> 00:27:30,850
this isn't necessarily the list and...
I think you wouldn't get this list of

409
00:27:30,850 --> 00:27:36,320
kinda quotes maybe before the Snowden
revelations about generalized surveillance

410
00:27:36,320 --> 00:27:38,029
across the world.

411
00:27:38,029 --> 00:27:41,160
A lot of people talked about how their
online activities were

412
00:27:41,160 --> 00:27:45,140
being accessed or logged without their
consent, and especially among

413
00:27:45,140 --> 00:27:47,669
Tor users there was this
notion of wanting to be

414
00:27:47,669 --> 00:27:51,189
public by effort, but private by default.

415
00:27:51,319 --> 00:27:57,049
And when you talk to Wikipedians, they
talked about their edit histories and how

416
00:27:57,049 --> 00:28:01,299
the edit histories themselves might be
somewhat sensitive.

417
00:28:03,809 --> 00:28:06,799
In terms of loss of employment...

418
00:28:06,799 --> 00:28:13,049
many many employers now look at your
online footprint before they hire you.

419
00:28:13,049 --> 00:28:16,719
According to Monster, one of the big
employment websites,

420
00:28:16,719 --> 00:28:20,730
77% of employers google perspective
employees.

421
00:28:22,180 --> 00:28:26,810
From a Tor user, we had someone talk about
"I am transgender, I am queer, my boss

422
00:28:26,810 --> 00:28:30,369
would rant for hours about this kind of
person, that kind of person, the other

423
00:28:30,369 --> 00:28:34,179
kind of person, all of which I happen to
be... and I decided if I was going to do

424
00:28:34,179 --> 00:28:37,829
anything online at all, I better look into
options for protecting myself, because

425
00:28:37,829 --> 00:28:40,179
I didn't want to get fired."

426
00:28:40,179 --> 00:28:44,529
In Wikipedia, someone said: "A friend of
mine was also involved in this discussion

427
00:28:44,529 --> 00:28:47,910
and he actually got it worse than I did.
He's in a position now where

428
00:28:47,910 --> 00:28:52,110
anyone who googles him finds allegations
that he is this awful monster, and

429
00:28:52,110 --> 00:28:55,369
he's terrified of having to look for work
now because you google him,

430
00:28:55,369 --> 00:28:57,379
and that's what you find.

431
00:28:57,379 --> 00:29:01,750
So these things can have a real impact
on people. So...

432
00:29:01,790 --> 00:29:05,989
and then there is harassment. So this is
a quote from a Wikipedian who said:

433
00:29:05,989 --> 00:29:10,239
"I would say that the fear of harassment
of real, of stalking and things like that

434
00:29:10,239 --> 00:29:13,539
is quite substantial, at least among
administrators I know,

435
00:29:13,539 --> 00:29:15,309
especially women."

436
00:29:15,309 --> 00:29:18,519
From a Tor user there was someone who
talked about "this is a map

437
00:29:18,519 --> 00:29:21,989
of active hate groups in the
United States"

438
00:29:21,989 --> 00:29:25,609
and how they had experienced problems
with these hate groups in the past

439
00:29:25,609 --> 00:29:29,519
and they wanted to see who was active in
their area, and they would

440
00:29:29,519 --> 00:29:33,320
go to the websites of these hate groups
and sort of for obvious reasons

441
00:29:33,320 --> 00:29:37,549
they didn't want their home IP address
to appear in the logs of these

442
00:29:37,549 --> 00:29:40,179
hate group websites.

443
00:29:42,889 --> 00:29:46,759
Safety of loved ones,
also personal safety.

444
00:29:47,179 --> 00:29:51,499
A lot of people talked about, y'know,
real, concrete, not just threats but

445
00:29:51,499 --> 00:29:54,779
things that had happened to them or to
people that they knew.

446
00:29:54,779 --> 00:29:59,129
In Tor there is this story: they bursted
his door down and

447
00:29:59,129 --> 00:30:02,149
they beat the ever living crap out of him.
He was hospitalized

448
00:30:02,149 --> 00:30:05,850
for two and a half weeks, and they told
him: "if you and your family wanna live,

449
00:30:05,850 --> 00:30:07,840
you're gonna have to stop causing trouble"

450
00:30:07,840 --> 00:30:09,570
and they said that to him in farsee.

451
00:30:09,570 --> 00:30:12,750
I have a family so after I visited him
in the hospital, I started...

452
00:30:12,750 --> 00:30:15,909
well at first I started shaking, and I
went into a cold sweat

453
00:30:15,909 --> 00:30:20,019
and then I realized I have to start taking
my human rights activities

454
00:30:20,019 --> 00:30:22,459
into other identities through
the Tor network.

455
00:30:22,869 --> 00:30:24,659
And on the Wikipedia side:

456
00:30:24,659 --> 00:30:28,229
"I pulled back from some of that Wikipedia
work when I could no longer hide

457
00:30:28,229 --> 00:30:32,179
in quite the same way. For a long time I
lived on my own, so it's just my own

458
00:30:32,179 --> 00:30:36,049
personal risk I was taking with things,
now my wife lives here as well

459
00:30:36,049 --> 00:30:37,699
and I can't take that same risk."

460
00:30:41,329 --> 00:30:45,619
Lastly, people were concerned about
reputation loss.

461
00:30:45,619 --> 00:30:52,179
In Wikipedia there has been known to be
edit wars that escalate into vendettas

462
00:30:52,179 --> 00:30:55,879
here's a sort of example of an edit war
where y'know some user says:

463
00:30:55,879 --> 00:31:03,779
"I hate big bitch Alison," who is then
blocked indefinitely by Alison.

464
00:31:03,779 --> 00:31:07,220
People are worried about this sort of
thing escalating and then somebody

465
00:31:07,220 --> 00:31:12,179
doing something off of the Internet to
call them names, or mess with their

466
00:31:12,179 --> 00:31:15,599
reputation... and that would have a
negative effect on their life.

467
00:31:15,599 --> 00:31:21,919
In Tor there is a couple interesting cases
that sort of concerns guilt by association

468
00:31:21,919 --> 00:31:24,529
So there is someone who participates on
image boards,

469
00:31:24,529 --> 00:31:27,059
on 8chan or infinite chan,

470
00:31:27,059 --> 00:31:31,380
and I don't know if you guys are that
aware of this... it's sort of the place

471
00:31:31,380 --> 00:31:34,310
which was kind of started by people that
were blocked by 4chan,

472
00:31:34,310 --> 00:31:36,830
so it's the people that 4chan think are
kind of sketchy

473
00:31:36,830 --> 00:31:39,740
*laughter*

474
00:31:39,740 --> 00:31:43,499
and this person said: "Look, I stand
behind the material and the content that

475
00:31:43,499 --> 00:31:45,789
I have created, but some people
on this site,

476
00:31:45,789 --> 00:31:48,999
I wouldn't wanna be associated with them."

477
00:31:48,999 --> 00:31:53,549
So, there is another person who talked
about "look I've created some online

478
00:31:53,549 --> 00:31:59,249
resources about various pharmaceuticals,
but I don't wanna be very associated

479
00:31:59,249 --> 00:32:04,009
with the community that posts stuff about
stuff like that.

480
00:32:05,499 --> 00:32:07,119
So some other threats.

481
00:32:07,919 --> 00:32:10,929
Some people talked about diminished
project quality.

482
00:32:10,929 --> 00:32:15,619
In particular a lot of the Wikipedians
that we talked to

483
00:32:15,619 --> 00:32:18,149
were somewhat prominent in the
Wikipedia project,

484
00:32:18,149 --> 00:32:21,979
and in some respects had kind of achieved
some degree of like

485
00:32:21,979 --> 00:32:25,909
rock star status as editors, if such
things can be.

486
00:32:26,379 --> 00:32:30,459
They found it very difficult to edit
anymore because they'd edit a page

487
00:32:30,459 --> 00:32:34,059
and that page hadn't received a lot of
attention but people would see that

488
00:32:34,059 --> 00:32:37,510
they had edited it and there would be
sort of hordes of people that would

489
00:32:37,510 --> 00:32:40,479
descend on that page, and mess with it.

490
00:32:40,489 --> 00:32:44,420
And they found that they couldn't do that
without actually sort of harming the pages

491
00:32:44,420 --> 00:32:46,239
that they were trying to edit.

492
00:32:46,239 --> 00:32:50,599
Similarly, there were some Tor users who
were talked about, y'know,

493
00:32:50,599 --> 00:32:54,690
not wanting to sort of... take credit for
their work because they were worried

494
00:32:54,690 --> 00:32:58,769
they wouldn't have the credentials to be
taken seriously in various ways,

495
00:32:58,769 --> 00:33:00,029
or things like that.

496
00:33:00,029 --> 00:33:03,940
Only two people in our project actually
talked about worrying about

497
00:33:03,940 --> 00:33:12,320
legal sort of sanctions, government
sanctions for their participation.

498
00:33:12,320 --> 00:33:16,320
There were a lot of people that talked
about computer security concerns

499
00:33:16,320 --> 00:33:19,769
which is not so much a privacy concern,
though it's very related, and I'm

500
00:33:19,769 --> 00:33:24,460
going to talk about that because this
group might be interested.

501
00:33:24,460 --> 00:33:27,749
On the Tor side, people liked to see
authentication properties

502
00:33:27,749 --> 00:33:32,440
of .onion services. The idea that when
you go to a .onion website,

503
00:33:32,440 --> 00:33:37,440
the address is self-authenticating, you
know where you're going.

504
00:33:37,440 --> 00:33:41,289
But a lot of people who use Tor talked
about the general data hygiene idea

505
00:33:41,289 --> 00:33:45,879
that there's sort of less data about them
in unknown websites,

506
00:33:45,879 --> 00:33:49,159
in unknown databases of companies
because they don't leave as many

507
00:33:49,159 --> 00:33:55,010
online footprints, and then you see all
these high profile break-ins that happen

508
00:33:55,010 --> 00:33:58,639
and these databases get stolen, if you're
using Tor, maybe you're less likely

509
00:33:58,639 --> 00:34:00,209
to be in those databases.

510
00:34:00,209 --> 00:34:02,599
That was the idea there.

511
00:34:02,599 --> 00:34:05,969
From Wikipedia a lot of people were
concerned about

512
00:34:05,969 --> 00:34:08,020
their Wikipedia credentials.

513
00:34:08,020 --> 00:34:12,879
They talked about not logging in on
public terminals and things like that,

514
00:34:12,879 --> 00:34:17,590
in particular being concerned about the
security of administrative credentials

515
00:34:17,590 --> 00:34:22,679
that have privileges to, for example, look
up the IP address of users who had edited

516
00:34:22,679 --> 00:34:25,989
and things like that, which could
be abused.

517
00:34:27,309 --> 00:34:30,410
So some concrete things that the people
were afraid of,

518
00:34:30,410 --> 00:34:31,999
not a complete list:

519
00:34:31,999 --> 00:34:35,069
having their head photoshopped onto porn,
something that happens

520
00:34:35,069 --> 00:34:37,260
sometimes to editors...

521
00:34:37,260 --> 00:34:40,729
being beaten up, actually a couple of Tor
people mentioned this;

522
00:34:40,729 --> 00:34:43,260
being swatted;
receiving pipe bombs;

523
00:34:43,260 --> 00:34:47,080
having fake information about them
published online.

524
00:34:47,320 --> 00:34:52,180
Though there were people that said, look,
I don't really see a threat.

525
00:34:52,180 --> 00:34:56,469
And some participants said they don't
perceive threats when they're contributing

526
00:34:56,469 --> 00:35:00,800
but in a lot of cases they pointed out
that they enjoyed certain privileges

527
00:35:00,800 --> 00:35:04,020
related to perhaps their gender, their
nationality, or the fact that

528
00:35:04,020 --> 00:35:05,970
their interests were fairly mainstream.

529
00:35:05,970 --> 00:35:08,700
So here's a quote:
"yeah I'm not that worried about it,

530
00:35:08,700 --> 00:35:11,960
mainly because there's pretty good support
for some of these viewpoints,

531
00:35:11,960 --> 00:35:15,450
kind of a mainstream discourse, and it's
not so radical, I don't think anyone's

532
00:35:15,450 --> 00:35:17,300
going to be knocking down on my door.

533
00:35:17,300 --> 00:35:20,390
But I've been in contact with activists
who have been engaged with

534
00:35:20,390 --> 00:35:23,440
higher risk activities, and I do wonder
about, I do have concerns

535
00:35:23,440 --> 00:35:27,470
about their welfare, and the desire they
have to have the tools to

536
00:35:27,470 --> 00:35:31,930
be able to pursue their activities without
facing consequences."

537
00:35:31,930 --> 00:35:38,500
So in contrast to the jerk theme, there
are a lot of people who run Tor

538
00:35:38,500 --> 00:35:43,330
out of a sense of altruism, to provide
cover and solidarity.

539
00:35:43,920 --> 00:35:47,460
Someone said, I appreciate the need for
protecting vulnerable people

540
00:35:47,460 --> 00:35:51,390
around the world, so I run several relays,
some of them are exit relays,

541
00:35:51,390 --> 00:35:54,470
some of them are middle relays, and I
run them around the world".

542
00:35:54,470 --> 00:35:57,820
And someone else said:
"While you use it, you help

543
00:35:57,820 --> 00:36:01,950
diversify the network for those who may be
subject to traffic monitoring, and you can

544
00:36:01,950 --> 00:36:05,820
look up any information you like, whether
or not it's sensitive, and you'll get it,

545
00:36:05,820 --> 00:36:09,370
and if you live in a place where it may
not be the greatest in legal standing

546
00:36:09,370 --> 00:36:13,289
to look it up, you're able to find out
information."

547
00:36:14,459 --> 00:36:19,839
So mitigating strategies, how did people
deal with this when they wanted to

548
00:36:19,839 --> 00:36:26,319
participate in sites but they couldn't do
it through anonymous means, well,

549
00:36:26,319 --> 00:36:29,520
some people modified their participation,
and I'll talk about some of

550
00:36:29,520 --> 00:36:35,940
the chilling effects that we saw, and also
attempts to get anonymity in various ways

551
00:36:37,440 --> 00:36:40,079
So, lost editors.

552
00:36:40,389 --> 00:36:43,210
Several Tor users that we talked to,
actually mentioned that

553
00:36:43,210 --> 00:36:47,700
they had edited Wikipedia and they no
longer edited it, or they edited it

554
00:36:47,700 --> 00:36:50,230
less because of the difficulty of editing
through Tor.

555
00:36:50,230 --> 00:36:53,380
There was someone who said:
"Basically I used to edit Wikipedia

556
00:36:53,380 --> 00:36:57,470
prior to doing a lot of Tor, so yeah now
it's mostly reading... I used to

557
00:36:57,470 --> 00:37:01,730
do a lot of editing for license design
and for like some open source licenses,

558
00:37:01,730 --> 00:37:06,840
occasionally random forms and stuff that I
knew about, sometimes grammar.

559
00:37:09,780 --> 00:37:13,289
And people talked to us in particular
about the chilling effects

560
00:37:13,289 --> 00:37:17,910
of state surveillance, and in particular
the Snowden revelations.

561
00:37:17,910 --> 00:37:22,179
In March of 2015 Wikimedia foundation
announced that it was

562
00:37:22,179 --> 00:37:25,720
suing the National Security Agency.

563
00:37:25,720 --> 00:37:29,409
We asked people about that, and
the Wikipedians, some of them said

564
00:37:29,409 --> 00:37:32,929
"People aren't willing to engage with us
when they know their government is

565
00:37:32,929 --> 00:37:36,960
watching their every move." And they
said that in particular they can show

566
00:37:36,960 --> 00:37:39,960
that editing dropped off significantly on
certain articles

567
00:37:39,960 --> 00:37:42,680
after the Upstream program was revealed.

568
00:37:42,680 --> 00:37:48,329
Here's a quote from one of our Tor users
in the study that substantiates this.

569
00:37:48,329 --> 00:37:51,330
"For the Edward Snowden page, I've pulled
myself away from adding

570
00:37:51,330 --> 00:37:54,429
sensitive contributions, like different
references, because I thought

571
00:37:54,429 --> 00:37:59,100
that made be traced back to me
in some way. But not refraining from

572
00:37:59,100 --> 00:38:00,400
useful content I guess."

573
00:38:00,400 --> 00:38:04,779
Though, of course, adding references is
one of the things that contributes to

574
00:38:04,779 --> 00:38:09,819
the quality of articles and so on, and in
particular they said, articles about

575
00:38:09,819 --> 00:38:16,089
national security things, about terrorism
and so on, people didn't edit as much

576
00:38:16,089 --> 00:38:21,510
about these things anymore because they
were worried about ending up on a list.

577
00:38:21,510 --> 00:38:27,349
The other major topic that was chilled was
articles about women's health.

578
00:38:27,349 --> 00:38:31,890
So, here's a picture of a vacuum
aspiration abortion from the

579
00:38:31,890 --> 00:38:39,049
Wikipedia abortion article and a couple
of people told us about how, "look, any

580
00:38:39,049 --> 00:38:44,609
site that has to do with women or women's
issues is more contentiously edited,

581
00:38:44,609 --> 00:38:49,280
is more likely of inflaming people,
getting into edit wars, than other sites."

582
00:38:50,100 --> 00:38:53,769
There were a lot of trolls on the Internet
and there's a quote on the Internet:

583
00:38:53,769 --> 00:38:57,359
"Trolls have called their bosses and been
like 'Do you know that your employee

584
00:38:57,359 --> 00:38:59,510
was editing the clitoris article last
week?'"

585
00:38:59,510 --> 00:39:01,829
They will do stuff like that.

586
00:39:01,829 --> 00:39:07,000
So this means that, y'know, in particular
someone talked about "I was a medical

587
00:39:07,000 --> 00:39:10,890
student, I had my obstetrics text book
open, I was looking at the abortion

588
00:39:10,890 --> 00:39:14,029
article, I was thinking about making some
changes, but then I just

589
00:39:14,029 --> 00:39:20,460
pulled myself back and said, y'know,
I don't need that in my life."

590
00:39:20,460 --> 00:39:26,490
This is another area where privacy
concerns push back, cause people

591
00:39:26,490 --> 00:39:29,839
to not necessarily do things...

592
00:39:29,839 --> 00:39:36,539
And then there's this idea of a threshold
of participation, that the more involved

593
00:39:36,539 --> 00:39:40,529
you are, the more active you are in a
project, the more likely you're actually

594
00:39:40,529 --> 00:39:43,569
gonna encounter real problems.

595
00:39:43,569 --> 00:39:48,069
People involved in curating content,
deleting things, promoting things,

596
00:39:48,069 --> 00:39:51,619
arbitrating disputes, etc., they're going
to make enemies.

597
00:39:51,619 --> 00:39:54,200
Some of these enemies are going to make
nasty threats,

598
00:39:54,200 --> 00:39:56,550
and some of them are gonna act on them.

599
00:39:56,550 --> 00:40:00,000
Here is another quote of somebody:
"As long as I have that pseudonym ...

600
00:40:00,000 --> 00:40:05,330
"As long as I have that pseudonym ...
[[ see slide ]]

601
00:40:05,330 --> 00:40:10,549
[[ see slide ]]
... that turns up when you do that."

602
00:40:10,549 --> 00:40:14,720
People mention in particular, from the
Wikipedia side, that there were two sites:

603
00:40:14,720 --> 00:40:21,150
Wikipediocracy and The Wikipedia Review,
where people have critiques of Wikipedia

604
00:40:21,150 --> 00:40:27,860
and that people on these sites had done
threats and doxing of various people

605
00:40:27,860 --> 00:40:29,910
on the arbitration committee.

606
00:40:29,910 --> 00:40:33,160
Someone talked about "they found my
parents' home address, they found

607
00:40:33,160 --> 00:40:36,439
one of my old phone numbers, they wrote a
blog post about all of these

608
00:40:36,439 --> 00:40:39,330
horrible things I've done, and here's my
contact information,

609
00:40:39,330 --> 00:40:44,869
and for a good time call... and when it's
on the Internet it doesn't die.

610
00:40:45,099 --> 00:40:51,729
People that get to a certain level of
doing things, like handling abuse,

611
00:40:51,729 --> 00:40:53,629
had problems.

612
00:40:53,629 --> 00:40:57,630
So since I didn't have any privacy, I felt
limited in what I could do, I could still

613
00:40:57,630 --> 00:41:00,219
write articles but blocking people
was something

614
00:41:00,219 --> 00:41:03,209
I tried to avoid, since I didn't wanna
get angry phone calls.

615
00:41:03,209 --> 00:41:06,269
So someone else also talked about
activities that they used to do,

616
00:41:06,269 --> 00:41:08,429
but then after receiving threats and
things...

617
00:41:08,429 --> 00:41:12,440
I used to check for use of the N-word, the
ruder of the two F-words, one or two other

618
00:41:12,440 --> 00:41:16,969
things that were indicative of problems in
user space, and I deleted lots and lots of

619
00:41:16,969 --> 00:41:20,260
attack pages which were fairly hot in
dealing with them when they would

620
00:41:20,260 --> 00:41:23,779
turn up in article space, and when people
create a user account in somebody

621
00:41:23,779 --> 00:41:27,380
else's name and say a bunch of things
about that person they won't agree with,

622
00:41:27,380 --> 00:41:30,520
I used to deal with that, but then, y'know
they're not willing to

623
00:41:30,520 --> 00:41:33,560
deal with that anymore.

624
00:41:35,120 --> 00:41:37,729
Privacy measures that people took.

625
00:41:37,959 --> 00:41:42,730
Obviously in some cases people use Tor, we
talked to Tor users where that's possible

626
00:41:42,730 --> 00:41:46,460
People also talk about avoiding posting
linking information and details

627
00:41:46,460 --> 00:41:53,710
about who they are, not editing things
about y'know, their local things,

628
00:41:53,710 --> 00:41:57,710
things only they would know, etc.

629
00:41:57,710 --> 00:42:02,750
People talked about using Proxies or VPNs,
some people talked about HideMyAss,

630
00:42:02,750 --> 00:42:08,470
editing from a public computer using
multiple accounts in some cases, and

631
00:42:08,470 --> 00:42:18,590
using privacy browser plug ins and
safeguards like NoScript and Ghostery

632
00:42:18,590 --> 00:42:23,540
We asked people, both Tor users and
not Tor users if they had used Tor,

633
00:42:23,540 --> 00:42:27,359
what they thought of Tor, and there was
this person who said: "I tried using Tor,

634
00:42:27,359 --> 00:42:31,249
I did, when I was younger, and everything
was so slow and terrible, I was just like

635
00:42:31,249 --> 00:42:32,850
'so not worh it'."

636
00:42:32,850 --> 00:42:38,470
And in fact a couple years ago, Tor was in
fact pretty slow - it's gotten better!

637
00:42:38,470 --> 00:42:41,349
But the Tor users still talked about
bit about latencies, but

638
00:42:41,349 --> 00:42:45,630
a lot of them talked about these issues of
CAPTCHAs, unusable website features,

639
00:42:45,630 --> 00:42:47,940
the fact that it used to be slow...

640
00:42:47,940 --> 00:42:51,920
and Wikipedians on Tor talked about it
being slow or too much trouble,

641
00:42:51,920 --> 00:42:56,069
just the need to download the software and
connect to it every time... and people,

642
00:42:56,069 --> 00:42:58,680
some people found it unnecessary.

643
00:42:58,680 --> 00:43:04,569
There was some other interesting things
that came up.

644
00:43:04,569 --> 00:43:06,250
Some people talked about how

645
00:43:06,250 --> 00:43:09,440
they used information ?revelation?
as a defense mechanism.

646
00:43:09,440 --> 00:43:14,559
This idea that, okay, I'm gonna give you
some information about me, so you can't

647
00:43:14,559 --> 00:43:18,920
really dox me because that's my address
right there, or whatever.

648
00:43:18,920 --> 00:43:23,740
But people talked also about the limits of
long term participation. A lot of people

649
00:43:23,740 --> 00:43:28,670
that talked to us had started editing or
participating in online projects

650
00:43:28,670 --> 00:43:32,680
as a relatively young teenager,
and a lot of people

651
00:43:32,680 --> 00:43:37,450
start with things like fixing typos,
before they later become a member

652
00:43:37,450 --> 00:43:40,630
of the arbitration committee, or something
like that.

653
00:43:40,630 --> 00:43:44,460
It's hard to have this long term
perspective when you're first creating

654
00:43:44,460 --> 00:43:48,650
your login name and you identity
and so on.

655
00:43:48,650 --> 00:44:06,559
"Until it happens to you ...
[[ see slide ]]

656
00:44:06,559 --> 00:44:10,769
[[ see slide ]]
... some serious thought."

657
00:44:11,849 --> 00:44:17,400
As most good, ethnographic studies do, and
as this one was intended to do,

658
00:44:17,400 --> 00:44:21,420
it sort of raises more questions
than answers.

659
00:44:21,420 --> 00:44:23,190
That was our goal.

660
00:44:23,190 --> 00:44:27,970
We're hoping... we learned that Tor users
and Wikipedians share some

661
00:44:27,970 --> 00:44:32,480
privacy concerns, but they do have some
different perspectives.

662
00:44:32,480 --> 00:44:36,019
And we did learn that some value of
participation is being lost when people

663
00:44:36,019 --> 00:44:38,779
can't participate in a private way.

664
00:44:38,869 --> 00:44:44,180
We'd like to use this work to do some
follow-up studies, and also perhaps

665
00:44:44,180 --> 00:44:48,470
build a larger survey study so we can
learn more, see things that are more

666
00:44:48,470 --> 00:44:53,400
quantitative about this work.

667
00:44:53,400 --> 00:44:56,869
If you find this topic interesting, a
short plug for

668
00:44:56,869 --> 00:44:59,250
the privacy enhancing technology symposium

669
00:44:59,250 --> 00:45:02,779
which will be in July in Darmstadt.

670
00:45:02,779 --> 00:45:06,369
We're not presenting this particular
work here, but there is a lot of

671
00:45:06,369 --> 00:45:14,760
work on Tor, anonymity, privacy, so on
from the research community.

672
00:45:14,760 --> 00:45:19,480
And I'd like to thank my co-authors,
Andrea Forte and Nazanin Andalibi,

673
00:45:19,480 --> 00:45:25,400
our interview participants, the WIkimedia
foundation, the Tor project,

674
00:45:25,400 --> 00:45:29,039
the National Science Foundation that
funded Andrea's and my participation

675
00:45:29,039 --> 00:45:33,869
in this project, and all the people whose
images I've used in my slides...

676
00:45:33,869 --> 00:45:36,900
so... Thanks!
Any questions? Oh and by the way

677
00:45:36,900 --> 00:45:42,949
I'll be here for the whole conference, so
you can find me afterwards if...

678
00:45:42,949 --> 00:45:51,549
*applause*

679
00:45:51,549 --> 00:45:56,510
Herald Angel: Thanks a lot, Rachel
Greenstadt. And so, we hopefully have

680
00:45:56,510 --> 00:46:01,400
a few questions from you in the audience,
you can line behind the microphones

681
00:46:01,400 --> 00:46:05,940
we have 4 of them here in the audience
and also in the back there are 2,

682
00:46:05,940 --> 00:46:11,650
and we also have the Signal Angel present
but he didn't get any questions yet,

683
00:46:11,650 --> 00:46:14,790
but maybe some comments or something?

684
00:46:14,790 --> 00:46:16,819
Some feedback from the crowd on the
Internet?

685
00:46:16,819 --> 00:46:18,660
Rachel Greenstadt: but there is somebody
with a... [inaudible]

686
00:46:18,660 --> 00:46:23,369
Herald Angel: then let me immediately go
to the questions in the audience.

687
00:46:23,369 --> 00:46:26,210
Herald Angel: We have microphone 2, please

688
00:46:26,210 --> 00:46:32,900
HA: And, one second, can you please be
quiet if you go outside? Because that's

689
00:46:32,900 --> 00:46:34,319
really rude.

690
00:46:34,319 --> 00:46:39,139
Question: did you find out if Wikipedia
for example treats classical VPN or

691
00:46:39,139 --> 00:46:40,769
proxies differently from Tor?

692
00:46:40,769 --> 00:46:44,029
Rachel Greendstadt: If what?
Question: if they treat them differently

693
00:46:44,029 --> 00:46:48,730
from Tor, so do they have the same policy
in place for blocking, let's say,

694
00:46:48,730 --> 00:46:54,370
private VPN which can also be used to
change your IP with the click of a button,

695
00:46:54,370 --> 00:46:59,239
if you want to bully someone but it might
offer less privacy than Tor, but if you

696
00:46:59,239 --> 00:47:01,869
really only want to bully someone,
that might be enough.

697
00:47:01,869 --> 00:47:06,240
Rachel Greenstadt: I think it depends,
is the answer.

698
00:47:06,240 --> 00:47:12,349
The extensions that they have, they do
block a lot of things from IPs so I think

699
00:47:12,349 --> 00:47:15,700
it depends on if there's been abuse
through that thing before,

700
00:47:15,700 --> 00:47:20,480
they try and block open proxies, I think
some people said certain VPNs you can

701
00:47:20,480 --> 00:47:23,400
still edit through, and some you couldn't,
it really depended.

702
00:47:23,400 --> 00:47:28,010
Herald Angel: Thanks, microphone 1 please.

703
00:47:28,010 --> 00:47:31,520
Question: Wikipedia is by no means an
isolated case, right?

704
00:47:31,520 --> 00:47:34,569
RA: No, no
Question: And there's more and more

705
00:47:34,569 --> 00:47:39,510
capability of blocking Tor exit nodes and
whatnot, so where's the project going?

706
00:47:39,510 --> 00:47:43,529
I mean, the Great Firewall for example
could very well block all its users from

707
00:47:43,529 --> 00:47:46,559
accessing Tor, right?
RA: It actually does.

708
00:47:46,559 --> 00:47:52,279
So it blocks people from accessing Tor and
it blocks people from accessing Wikipedia,

709
00:47:52,279 --> 00:47:56,140
in terms of the Tor project there are
mechanisms through using

710
00:47:56,140 --> 00:48:01,960
pluggable transports and bridge addresses,
they can actually help people still

711
00:48:01,960 --> 00:48:05,920
access Tor, and then they'll be able to
read Wikipedia, but then again

712
00:48:05,920 --> 00:48:08,049
they won't be able to edit for these
reasons.

713
00:48:08,049 --> 00:48:13,340
HA: So, again, we have 15 minutes of break
after this, so you can get out after this

714
00:48:13,340 --> 00:48:16,359
and change the room, and please be
quiet if you really have to

715
00:48:16,359 --> 00:48:20,439
leave the room already or if you come in
the room already. Thank you.

716
00:48:20,439 --> 00:48:22,430
Now to the Signal Angel, please.

717
00:48:22,430 --> 00:48:27,579
Signal Angel: There is one question from
the Internet, from ?Whyness?, he or she

718
00:48:27,579 --> 00:48:31,829
is asking if there's actual a recorded
instance of someone attempting to

719
00:48:31,829 --> 00:48:36,059
put a pipe bomb in the post
because of Wikipedia edits.

720
00:48:36,059 --> 00:48:42,519
RA: I certainly don't have such
information. This was just

721
00:48:42,519 --> 00:48:46,799
people telling us things that they were
concerned about, or things that

722
00:48:46,799 --> 00:48:51,000
there had been threats that they'd
experienced.

723
00:48:51,000 --> 00:48:54,369
Nobody that I know of specifically
mentioned that they experienced

724
00:48:54,369 --> 00:48:55,369
a pipe bomb.

725
00:48:55,369 --> 00:49:01,470
Signal Angel: And another question from
?a_monk?: if blocked Tor traffic

726
00:49:01,470 --> 00:49:05,839
is a problem, why does the Tor project
publish the exit IP list, making it

727
00:49:05,839 --> 00:49:08,329
easy to block?

728
00:49:08,329 --> 00:49:16,000
RA: That would be a question for the Tor
people, my understanding of it is that

729
00:49:16,000 --> 00:49:20,339
the Tor project does try and be a good
Internet citizen and they don't want to

730
00:49:20,339 --> 00:49:26,650
encourage the kind of, sort of, arms race
that would happen with sort of...

731
00:49:26,650 --> 00:49:30,349
people trying to like find all the exits,
and block them versus making it

732
00:49:30,349 --> 00:49:34,479
just look, here it is, this is what's
going on, and... it's also very helpful

733
00:49:34,479 --> 00:49:37,970
when you're running an exit node, to be
able to say, look, this thing is

734
00:49:37,970 --> 00:49:42,819
an exit node and that's what was going on
when this thing happened

735
00:49:42,819 --> 00:49:49,369
through my computer. So I think, y'know,
there's the ability of the exit relay

736
00:49:49,369 --> 00:49:54,069
operators to be able to say what they're
doing is also an important concern.

737
00:49:54,069 --> 00:49:59,119
Herald Angel: so there's standing someone
at microphone 5.

738
00:49:59,119 --> 00:50:03,680
Question: You mentioned zero-knowledge
proofs in the beginning, is there any more

739
00:50:03,680 --> 00:50:05,269
research on this?

740
00:50:05,269 --> 00:50:13,269
RA: Uhm, yeah, so... If you look at the
research on Nymble

741
00:50:13,269 --> 00:50:15,639
by Apu Kapadia, there's also some people

742
00:50:15,639 --> 00:50:19,089
in Nick Hopper's group at the university
of Minnesota, there's also

743
00:50:19,089 --> 00:50:24,169
Ryan Henry in Indiana University
that's done a lot of work on this

744
00:50:24,169 --> 00:50:27,680
in Ian Goldberg's group at Waterloo,
those are the people that I would

745
00:50:27,680 --> 00:50:32,359
look up in terms of anonymous blacklisting
schemes, and I'm sure I'm forgetting

746
00:50:32,359 --> 00:50:35,700
some of them right now, so hopefully
they'll forgive me, but those are

747
00:50:35,700 --> 00:50:37,430
good places to start.

748
00:50:37,430 --> 00:50:41,799
Herald Angel: we have the next question at
microphone 1.

749
00:50:41,799 --> 00:50:49,039
Question: Do you know if Wikipedia ever
thought about hashing IP addresses,

750
00:50:49,039 --> 00:50:55,960
so that the contributions are still unique
but the users are anonymized?

751
00:50:57,610 --> 00:51:02,029
RA: Nobody at WIkipedia talked to us about
that, so I do not know if they thought

752
00:51:02,029 --> 00:51:04,089
about that or not.

753
00:51:04,089 --> 00:51:10,559
Herald Angel: and the last comment or
question at the Signal Angel microphone.

754
00:51:10,559 --> 00:51:14,859
Signal Angel: Thanks, not really a
question, more a comment...

755
00:51:14,859 --> 00:51:22,359
"I just wanted to relate, indeed Wikipedia
blocking Tor is pretty concerned

756
00:51:22,359 --> 00:51:28,750
also for Tor users because for instance,
the French Wikipedia articles about Tor

757
00:51:28,750 --> 00:51:34,650
have very, very poor quality and lot of
people end up asking us questions about

758
00:51:34,650 --> 00:51:39,930
Tor and are missing from because of that,
and I cannot fix it because I am not

759
00:51:39,930 --> 00:51:44,500
willing to edit Wikipedia without Tor. And
that is also a pretty big issue I think."

760
00:51:44,500 --> 00:51:49,109
RA: Yeah, so it would be interesting from
my perspective, using this to then look at

761
00:51:49,109 --> 00:51:53,230
the articles, the types of articles about
Tor, about anonymous participation,

762
00:51:53,230 --> 00:51:58,059
where we would suggest... we'd like to do
a bigger study, learn what articles about

763
00:51:58,059 --> 00:52:03,130
that anonymous users would edit if they
were going to edit Wikipedia, and then

764
00:52:03,130 --> 00:52:07,309
we could do an analysis like they did
about the movie sites to figure out

765
00:52:07,309 --> 00:52:11,739
if these articles are in some way shorter
or of lower quality than other articles

766
00:52:11,739 --> 00:52:13,970
because they're missing that perspective.

767
00:52:13,970 --> 00:52:20,569
Herald Angel: Thank you Rachel, thank you
for the questions, and warm applause again

768
00:52:20,569 --> 00:52:21,789
for Rachel GreenStadt.

769
00:52:21,959 --> 00:52:23,700
*applause*

770
00:52:23,780 --> 00:52:24,709
RA: Thanks

771
00:52:25,989 --> 00:52:30,079
*tune playing*