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My proudly present, our next
speaker.
He's done a lot of exciting things and
I will just give you some very brief
examples.
It's things like running a company
communication company in
Iraq and Afghanistan,
the things about building a data haven
on a platform in the
Atlantic Ocean and the North Sea.
So I'm
very proud to have him here.
Please give a warm welcome to Ryan
Lekki.
Thank you very much for the introduction
and it's great to be here, C.C.C.
is my favorite conference out of all the
conferences I go to great crowd
first day. It's already really exciting,
so looking forward to it.
So I'm going to talk about data havens
from Haven Koja today.
Just a quick overview.
Who am I? What's a data haven?
Where do they come from?
Why would you why have they failed?
And then some ways to be successful.
I really like this idea of having a
conference track on things that have
failed because normally people are
ashamed to talk about things that have
failed or try to minimize how much things
and things that have gone wrong.
And it's really the only way to learn.
The only way to learn is to make
mistakes. And it's better for someone
else to make those mistakes rather than,
you know, rather than making them over
and over again. So.
So just as background, I've been
interested in crypto and cash,
specifically anonymous electronic cash
since the early 1990s, the cypherpunks
mailing list and a bunch of stuff like
that started the offshore data Haven
Haven, which we're going to talk about in
two thousand with some friends of mine,
then work in some war zones doing
satellite communications, using some of
the experience I had from the Haven
cooperation.
Then I needed a trusted computing startup
working on trust and cloud computing.
And now I work at CloudFlare, which
bought my trust in cloud computing
company.
So first thing is, what does the data
haven? A lot of people use the term.
They use it for different things.
We're going to talk about the Wikipedia
definition, which is now, I would say,
the canonical way to find the definition
of something, a refuge for uninterrupted
or unregulated data.
So that's really two parts.
And there's a lot of factors that go into
it, uninterrupted meaning
against natural disaster, against normal
service interruptions, things like that,
but also against active attacks,
censorship, things like that.
There's a concept of regulatory arbitrage
where you have one set of laws in one
place, another set of laws in another
place, and you're trying to pick
and pick and choose which pieces of law
are the best for you and the best for
your operation.
And there's all sorts of traits that go
into a data haven.
There's a physical, legal, operational
cryptographic data haven
could be both a physical data haven
or a software, a data haven
sort of cryptographic approach or some
combination or hybrid approach to those
things.
So the origin, as with
a lot of things before someone but one
people have talked about it and thought
about what could happen.
Fiction, science fiction is generally
a great predictor of science fact
and science fiction is talked about
this for a long time.
There's also analogies and some very
similar fields that are outside of
the data or data processing world that
are very similar.
And there are some people doing data
havens, at least in some sense, before
Haven. But Haven is really the first
purpose built physical data haven
that that I certainly know about.
So in fiction, there's some great science
fiction. As we move down this list,
they get more and more precise.
Early on, it was more about the concept
of crypto software things.
Then it was sort of passing references to
it, I would say. Islands in the Net by
Bruce Sterling, which is a great book, is
probably the first story
that really references data havens and
multiple data havens and how they
interoperate. If you haven't read these,
all of these are great books.
They're part of the canon of science
fiction. So I would definitely read them.
Cryptonomicon has a really interesting
history with HEREINTO.
It was started probably ninety eight
or so who've started writing it.
I didn't find out about it until after
we'd already started having code, but
they were sort of completely parallel
evolution and huge numbers
of weird parallels like people's names.
A lot, a lot of factors about it were
very, very similar. So I guess it was
just the right place at the right time.
And then as you move down this list,
Dayman and Freedom are probably my two
favorite sci fi books.
They're the very
persistently referenced the idea of
software that can't be terminated.
So it solves this uninterrupted problem.
But I would say that now data havens are
like a concept that, ah, that's used in
fiction quite, quite frequently.
And then there are some analogies that
are outside of the sort of data
processing world free trade zones in
countries. I think U.A.E is probably the
the biggest exponent of these
are a great analogy where you have a
country that has one set of laws but in a
certain geographic area or a certain set
of entities, they're allowed to have
different laws.
And the idea is that foreign businesses
will locate there, take advantage of
these favorable laws and they wouldn't
otherwise have been in the country and it
doesn't affect the country.
There's also the concept of offshore
banking, the whole theoretical Swiss
bank account where you are a
political leader in some foreign country
and you invested so much of money from
your country and sent it off to another
country, or you live
in a country that's horribly repressive
and we'll take away all your assets and
you store them in a place like this.
It's really a value neutral kind of
thing, the concept of tax havens.
I mean, people talk, at least in America,
a lot about the way Apple shelters a lot
of their income through foreign entities,
even though it's earned over sort of
overseas. But these have existed for a
long time. And then shipping, I think
basically all ships of
large commercial ships are registered in
a small number of jurisdictions that are
different from the beneficial owners of
that thing, like Liberia.
Countries like that have huge numbers of
ships but don't really have businesses
there for them. And that's just because
they have very favorable laws.
And then there's gambling centers like
McCallan next to Hong Kong.
And China is not really catering
to the local population.
It's people flying there to gamble.
So there's that.
And then there were some data havens pre
have go.
So like the late 80s, early
90s, mid 90s,
you know, community, there was the sort
of like top state system, which
these were servers that were relatively
well protected by usually being run
by an admin on the side or something like
that.
There was a company, Offshore Information
Services Limited, run by Vince Kate, who
is one of the
top people from the cypherpunks community
creating this kind of stuff.
He started a business offshore before
almost anyone from the US had considered
it in. Field in Anguilla,
he was actually my next door neighbor
while I lived there.
He said it was a relatively small
business. He had a bunch of, like, car
batteries as a UPS and
10 base to connection to me and
t one connection or one point five
megabit connection.
And he had a couple of really big
clients. But this was to some extent one
of the first data havens because it
hosted data from the US that was, under
US law, not allowed to be retained for a
period of time. It basically was a
driver's license database from, I think,
the state of Texas, where they couldn't
retain the documents longer than a year.
But there's this other company that would
retain them forever and let people search
against them again, value neutral.
And then there's the whole, like, dark
period of the 90s, which I'm afraid we're
going back to, where crypto software
was banned from export, or at least
you couldn't give it to a foreign
nationals. So effectively, you had to do
all your crypto development if you wanted
to be open outside of the United States.
And we're sort of going back in that
direction with the exploits world.
But in that case, you had to be outside
of the US and a non US citizen to do a
lot of the development.
There was a system that Ross Anderson
from Cambridge had Triniti and then
a few people, two
of whom are on the possibly Satoshi list,
created versions of it.
And I created a pretty bad version of it.
TasRail Weber.
These are all software systems at the
end. And then of course, there's the
concept of availability from a high end
data center. You've got great data
centers where people spent three sixty
five men in San Francisco, two billion
dollars building this data center.
The idea being that it'll stay up through
any sort of disaster. It's isolated from
earthquakes. It's got a bunch of diesel
fuel onsite.
Of course, there's a software bug and all
the UPSs. So they all crash at the same
time. But, yeah, minor data
and there's been uses of this censorship.
Resistance is the first thing that most
people think of when they think of a data
haven. They think of data that someone's
actively trying to shut down.
But part of it is just uncertainty.
Like until very recently, we're still
ongoing. We don't really know the legal
status of things like Bitcoin.
So if you can pick a place that has
decided what the legal status is, it's a
lot less risky.
And there's also just durability and
reliability. If you're spending a lot of
money to have a service that needs to be
up all the time, you probably don't want
to host it in your basement. You want to
find a physically secure facility for it.
And there's a lot of things.
And then there's, of course, choice of
law like gambling in the US is
a super big problem to have any
connection to, especially recently purely
for
protection of the big existing casino
industry. There's no moral really issues
with it or anything particularly, but
you can't have any of that stuff touch
the US. You have to pick a jurisdiction
where you can.
So then there's this place called
Sealand, so World
War two, anti-aircraft anti-aircraft
fortress in the North Sea, which
if you just take that statement, it's
crazy.
So during World War two, the British had
a problem with German bombers coming in
and bombing London.
So they decided they wanted to intercept
them not over London, but over the North
Sea. They started building these
floating platforms out in
the North Sea. And we're not floating,
but they're anchored platforms in the
North Sea. And
these
sort of got left behind at the end of the
war. And they were sort of legal
curiosities. Most of them got torn down
and one of them didn't.
The U.K. also did not have commercial
radio. So
people were doing pirate pirate radio
broadcasts from ships.
Then they started cracking down on pirate
radio broadcasts from ships.
And so people started moving farther and
farther out and they eventually started
looking at places like this.
As far as I know, they never actually did
pirate radio operations from this
particular fort. They did it from other
locations. But it was basically this
place that was in at the
time, international waters occupied
by somebody who declared it sovereign.
And that if you look at international
law, which is kind of crazy, is how you
start a country. And so
it's probably maybe sort of a country
under the technical definition, although
the population is very small, territory
is very small or some other things.
No one really cared about it because it
was a relatively upstanding British
family that had it. They didn't do
anything bad with it.
They didn't really cause too much
trouble. The British are pretty
accommodating of that kind of thing.
And it was sort of interesting legal
curiosity, but that was about it.
And then then we came around,
there was this
set of people who will name
who had done business in
various places, Anguilla, various
other places, and thought, oh, Sealand
will be a great place to do it and having
them out there.
So that's that's our story.
So the founders are Sean and Joe
Hastings, who have done crypto software
for a long time.
And me, we'd worked on crypto software
actually in Anguilla about a year
apart and worked from
there for the Ayata reasons.
Samir Parekh, who was the first SSL
license vendor in the US in the 90s, and
Avi Friedman, who was an early guy
working on Internet stuff and then at
Akamai to much other places, were very
helpful. Early investors and we had
experienced first hand with Anguilla,
this little tiny country.
It's maybe seven thousand people in the
Caribbean that didn't really have
favorable laws in any way.
It just didn't have a lot of laws.
And we just moved there because it
was sort of a nice place to live, sort
of, if you like, Caribbean islands.
But there was no Internet, shady legal
system, all sorts of stuff like that.
So.
Purely by accident, basically, we were
all there at the same time,
so one of the things
that happened was, one, it was really
boring. I don't really like little
Caribbean islands. I'd be much happier in
a place with lots of fast Internet.
And it's one of those tourist places
where you're only busy and, what, one
month out of the year,
the law was unsettled and a lot of other
places we couldn't really go there.
We looked at some
other countries we might be able to go
to.
So we left and we left island or we left
Anguilla.
We rented the house from a
government officials brother at above
market rate. And then the other political
party got elected in and none of our work
permits were valid anymore.
So we basically got kicked off.
It was exactly what you'd expect from a
tiny country like that.
So we all left and we were all in Oakland
again. So Oakland, California.
So we were like hanging out, trying to
figure out what to do next and like, oh,
we can't go to another little Caribbean
island or something like that.
We have to find some better solution to
this thing because we all wanted to build
anonymous electronic cash, which is, I
would say, probably the most difficult
application to build.
It meets all the requirements later in
the talk.
So we were looking at either existing
countries, we could use free trade zones,
we could possibly negotiate with certain
countries.
And then this concept of microstates.
So like places like sea land,
there's a place in Australia, the river
province, all sorts of legal curiosities.
We found this book called How to Start
Your Own Country, which was Illume
Panic's press, which is sort
of an alternative.
Interesting stuff. Press and they
publish it. They mentioned Zealand.
We contacted them and did that.
But one of our other rejected ideas
was to get a bunch of ships
except toxic waste from a bunch of
countries, put servers on the same barge
as the toxic waste such that they
couldn't really do anything to the barge
without causing like an environmental
catastrophe. So, yes.
Yeah.
Yeah, I'm kind of glad
we didn't do that, actually,
so we found this place called Sealand and
emailed the guy.
It was a family that there were like two
people living out on the place part time,
and they ran
a fishing business in the in the coast
nearby.
So it was it was basically just used
it had a lot of stuff left over from
World War Two, like they did build it
right after the war. So there are no,
like, actual useful weapons or anything
on it. But it had like
tools and a bunch of stuff left over from
them. And it was about five thousand, ten
thousand square feet falling apart.
Lots of lots of issues.
All the rooms look sort of like this, if
not worse. This was actually one of the
cleanest rooms
and they did have guns, but they were
these like four inch deck guns
or something that were like rusted
solid and ended up getting cut and thrown
overboard.
And this is sort of the layout of the
thing, it was a structure to cylindrical
towers on top of a concrete barge.
The whole thing's made out of harassment
and a superstructure.
There were at one point three hundred
people living on this thing.
The most we ever got on.
It was about 20, but
usually around two.
And it was everything
you would fear a 50
or 60 year old sort of abandoned
structure would be like,
yeah, so they assembled it in place and
they sunk it. It was pretty crazy
and it was decorated in high British
fashion.
Yeah.
So, yeah. And it's where it is.
It's so they changed the law on
what, international waters where it used
to be three nautical miles and you were
international. They changed it with 12,
but it was after the declaration
of sea land being an independent country.
So it's probably
OK, but just adds
lots of uncertainty.
And if you see the town, Felixstowe, we
had a six story building there that we
beamed our communications using a point
to point wi fi shot to.
So it was a pretty close to shore, not
that far. But the North Sea is not a fun
place to be on a boat.
So there's sort of stages of the island,
Evancho adventure, all the ceiling stuff
that happened before I got involved
happened, but not a whole lot happened.
There was some crazy legal things, but
not very much physical infrastructure.
During the starting up phase.
We did a lot of physical stuff
and then we set up a business structure
in parallel. And I was like 19 years
old at the time. This was also during the
first dotcom boom.
So we didn't really have a lot of precedent
to sort of copy things
from. It'd be really easy to do most of
the stuff today. And technology was not
quite where it should have been.
But yeah, this is the structure as we
went up to it.
This is this is actually an older photo
or a newer photo and cleaned up a little
bit. But it was this basically bare
structure.
Getting out to it was on these little
rigid inflatable
rib boats, and you would lift
the entire boat out of the water using a
crane, which was an exciting process.
I learned to use pelican dry
cases because if you don't, then your
stuff gets wet. And it's really fun
when you have a non backed up sunny via
laptop to have to disassemble
it, run everything through DNA as
ionized water or the closest thing you
have, and then like remove
the electronic squirt from a hard drive
because your only copies of keys were on
that because somebody had taken your
laptop out of the drive back.
But yeah.
So things like that.
This is what it looks like when you're
getting carried up and it's really small
from the air helicopter
trips out for this thing because it's an
officer structure where like three
thousand pounds, so about five thousand
dollars or so each trip because they have
to be twin engine and everything else.
So we would only really is a helicopter
if the press were paying, if we were
doing it. We use these little boats or
used a fishing boat.
This is sort of the process of getting
winched up. In some cases you wear a
harness and it would get attached to the
back of your head and that.
And later we added a 500 pound
concrete ball as ballast, which made
the whole process even more dangerous
because if that thing hit you, also the
sea is pitching up and down like 15 feet.
So there's a timing
aspect to this. It's crazy.
Yeah.
So the really interesting part is the
datalink. So this is the first thing we
set up. This was a Teche on one point two
meter dish, part of a network
which I later worked on that kind of
stuff in Iraq and Afghanistan.
You could get maybe two megs down,
maybe a quarter mag up,
and it was a shared network across a lot
of networks. The interesting thing about
this is I had never really set up a
satellite network before.
And there's this whole polarization
angle thing where you have horizontal and
vertical polarization on signals.
It turns out that the alternate
polarization was actually the credit card
processor for like all the gas stations
in Europe.
And I didn't have the thing turn
correctly. So I blocked out satellite
credit card processing for like 10
minutes when I first saw this thing up,
which was kind of scary.
You can do that with like one small
satellite dish. But so that was our sort
of a backup link because VSAT systems go
to geostationary orbit and there's about
six hundred milliseconds, a thousand
milliseconds of latency added, which is
not so great for communications.
Then at the very top of this, sorry, I
didn't have any better photos.
I didn't take as many photos back then
as I would have as I should have.
There was a microwave link.
It was originally a wi fi link.
I think it was an eight or two eleven B
link with a PCMCIA card and
a bunch of cables and a bunch of like
completely hacked together junk going
from this to the building on shore.
We later replaced it with a thirty
thousand four by one system for no
good reason. That didn't work as well.
So yeah, the wi fi version works
better, way better. Then we had FreeBSD
boxes sitting on shore that had
E one cards because I was really anti
Cisco at the time because I wanted to
open source routers. So I ran everything
on Xebra and Free
BSD boxes and
the whole thing was like crazy because
you could we didn't have enough
redundancy and power cycle.
And so there were times where the power
would go out in this building or
something would crash. And we have to
like take a boat to go to a location a
bunch of times where I did, like a
McWorld upgrade without
it working and the machine wouldn't
come back up, stupid stuff like that that
I would never do again.
But you can you can
make this work with, like, really crazy
stuff today. You could do this with us.
You're actually within range of a cell
phone, I'm sure. So you can just put a
cell phone data card in your laptop and
do largely the same thing.
The way we set up our network was
actually intentionally this
way. We had a transport session that went
between us and London Telehouse and
another appearing facility so that we
publicly appeared with people in these
high bandwidth locations.
We did a lot of filtering and then
brought it back to the To Haven CO
via links that we control that we could
obfuscate because those links were much
harder to replace.
Something I talked about a little bit.
OK, so we did launch.
There was this Wired magazine has
like a four month lead time on
publications.
So we were telling them what we
were going to do in advance of actually
doing it because it had to be ready
like we wanted it ready before the
the press hit.
So there's a lot of speculative stuff.
Probably the dumbest quote was the
nitrogen filled data center quote, where
conceivably you could do that, but we had
no money to do that kind of thing.
So we had a secret plan to all of this,
which was to get a lot of press and using
all that press in the peak of the market,
be able to negotiate with another country
to set up the second version of this,
because our thinking was that doing the
first one of these would be really hard
to have any country say this would be a
worthwhile thing to do.
But getting another country to say, oh,
we'll be the backup site for that would
be really easy. So we get like a a more
real place like, say, Hong Kong to be our
secondary data center.
And then once you've got to, you can do
like ten of them really easily.
So that was a reasonable plan, I think.
But we didn't get to that point.
We got about three hundred major press
articles. We had press flying out there
all the time. It was a height of dotcom
frenzy. But even at this point, it was
team disorganization and stuff.
We had like a sales email box that we
didn't answer. We just let, like,
accumulate because we were arguing over
which tech. Getting system we should use,
so we just didn't answer it, which was
yeah, yeah,
so yeah. And this is one of our watch
photos and this is me
and this is Michael Bates, who was at the
time the son of the Prince of Sealants,
who's like the second.
I don't know what the real thing is, but.
Yeah.
This is yet more examples of lovely
British decor for this place,
press corps.
So, as you can expect,
given as a failed talk, there was there's
a crash. So there was the dotcom
collapse, which I don't know how many
people remember the details of it, but
it was multiple things that happened
in a row.
It was sort of bad in two thousand.
And it got a lot bad in 2001 and it was
bad for different sectors.
There were all sorts of crazy things.
The thing I really remember is Nortel
stock.
Apparently, if you had bought beer in
Canada and save the cans for the
collection like the deposit, you would
have more money than if you had bought
Nortel stock because it went to like
almost nothing.
So we ran out of money. We thought we
could raise more money. We didn't have
any more money.
We were burning two
big fifty five gallon drums of diesel
fuel every day. We had a lot of staff,
all sorts of crazy stuff like that.
So we didn't we didn't have the ability
to raise money from third parties.
So we sort of refinanced.
And we originally had a contract where we
could buy all of Celan for about five
million dollars in six to 12
months after launch, thinking, oh, it'll
be really easy to raise whatever number
of billions of dollars.
And today or in 1999, that would be
true. Not true in two thousand twenty
one. So and instead we ended up
bringing the royal family of Sealand in
as a partner.
They had run this place since like
nineteen sixty six.
It was their main
asset, their main pride and joy.
They thought about a lot.
So they thought about this entirely
differently than we did.
We were willing to push the limits on one
data center in order to
expand the model to things like that.
They were much more conservative,
which I can't really fault them for.
And then we ran on a shoebox budget, my
friend Abby, one of our investors.
So he put in, I think, like a million
dollars or so originally.
And then every time I'd fly to Boston,
he'd give me a bunch of cash, like a
bunch of cash, like ten grand or
something. And I would use that to pay
bills. And we didn't really keep track of
it. It was like the ultimate thing you
don't do with investments of like
throwing good money after bad.
I just kept it running, which was awesome
with him, but yeah, not a good financial
decision
then.
So we basically run out of money.
We're spending like 30, 50 K a week or so
on renovations.
And then we got down to the point where
we had to pay for things from our server
hosting and we had maybe
like a grand left over every month.
We had this food which was mostly left
over from pre Haven, CODIS,
and this was.
Yeah, yeah, it was it was exciting
of those things. There's some corned beef
from Argentina that is actually the most
wretched thing I have eaten.
And we ate like most of the stuff
in the place.
So as far as servers go,
these are a bunch of Celeron five thirty
three boxes.
We have this.
I think fairly justifiable fear that if
people saw how little infrastructure
we had, nobody would actually buy
anything.
This was our showcase data room of what
the rest of the rooms would look like.
This was, in fact, the only one.
So, yeah,
it got a little bit more populated.
But this is about like two thirds of the
peak, very small number of servers,
some UPSs. We've got a bigger GPS later,
but all basically FreeBSD and Linux
stuff.
Pretty reasonable, but yeah, very, very
small scale.
And we never had more than eight megs of
bandwidth going to the place.
We had aggressive caching and then much
more aggressive caching after I left,
which is an interesting story.
This is about peak capacity,
so.
Sitting in and the rooms are 20
or they're like six meter cylinders,
so you've got a circular set of desks
around them in this room.
And that was where I spent most of my
time, mostly on Iasi, which is the main
thing you do when you're on a little
island like that.
Yeah. So speaking of aggressive
caching, so we have this whole model
where we would host things where rather
we would host things on sea and then we
would have hearing sessions
and transit purchased
in places like London, Telehouse and then
a place in New York, and then we bring
the transport back.
Those boxes are really tempting
to use for caching
after I left, which wasn't the most
friendly of circumstances at the end of
2002, I think they decided
it would be a lot cheaper to just not
have anything on the island anymore and
put everything in those locations and not
tell anyone.
It was really obvious for two reasons.
One, the pink times were zero
milliseconds from the edge to this
noise, about two milliseconds by speed of
light. And then there was a huge fire
because the original structure was all
like Feresten and everything else.
The new generator room, which
they stored a bunch of oily rags in,
was made of tarpaper.
And the predictable thing happened after
like five years. I don't know why it took
five years, but it eventually completely
caught on fire as a huge fire and nothing
happened on the server.
So, yeah,
there's that. So given
many, I would say the failure here
was overdetermined. So we have lots of
reasons why it failed and we need to
piece apart why those things are some of
them are totally idiosyncratic to a tiny
platform. LNC those are less interesting
unless you for some reason want to build
something on a tiny platform.
See, there's other things that are much
more general as data haven issues,
the core reasons where economics, the
product itself wasn't all that great.
And to be honest, we were not the
greatest team.
None of us had any experience running
large businesses or even small businesses
or really anything.
And then we did have the market like it's
really lame to blame the market for it,
but I think the twenty two thousand one
collapse in bandwidth prices was a
fundamental driver.
So what happened is we had an inherently
high cost, which was totally fine in two
thousand.
There were two reasons for high cost.
It was high cost because it was on this
little tiny platform.
It was also high cost because we didn't
have any scale. When you're buying eight
megabits of Internet and transporting it
over, once you pay a pretty high cost
per megabit, if you're buying one hundred
and fifty five, which is what we'd
originally ordered, the cost per megabit
is a lot lower.
And then we had the issue that in
nineteen ninety nine two thousand, the
price for I guess Akamai
service was like two to three thousand
dollars and megabits per second.
Effectively transit was one to
two K or something, a megabit.
Then the market collapsed and people
would start selling below their own cost
because they had to.
Sometimes they sell below their marginal
cost, which is crazy, but usually
bandwidth doesn't have a marginal cost.
So basically, like the market price went
to like ten dollars and our cost was five
hundred and we built everything on like
three thousand. So that was a serious
problem. And then there was another more
additionally serious problem is we are
missing some key components to make this
a great product. And then we didn't have
any money to do anything differently
because we only had only only eight megs.
We had to really ration bandwidth.
There's a lot of cool stuff you can do
that you'd want to have more bandwidth
for. This was also pre virtualization.
So you had the physical servers and one
server per customer was like a crazy
thing.
The biggest problem I would say is we had
no way for our customers to handle
payments. If you were a purely
cipher space business, you still had
to go incorporate somewhere to get a bank
account to accept credit card processing.
There was no Bitcoin back then, and
I proposed the beginning of this thing
that we fund building anonymous
electronic cash as the first enabler for
this thing. Because if you have anonymous
electronic cash and a secure place to put
your server, you don't actually need to
incorporate anywhere. You can just have a
key as your your thing.
But we didn't do that.
And then we never really found a single,
really solid application for this thing.
So all the things from doing start ups
that I know you shouldn't do, we did.
And then the team and structure issue.
Fundamentally, the issue was that
the ceiling people were more
traditional, much, much more legally
averse to risk uncertainty, things like
that. And then there was me
and I was very willing
to push the limits on stuff because
I just walk away from it if it failed.
So like, I was trying to get to success.
There's a whole model in like venture
capital where it's OK to fail like one
hundred times if you're one success is
like a ten thousand times bigger
return.
So we were pushing for that kind of
thing. And that isn't the kind of thing
you do if it's your your house,
basically.
Then we had lots of internal team issues,
politics like that. And also it's just
boring. Like this place was like five or
ten thousand square feet.
It was kind of cool when I got to leave
every week or two. But there was a period
where I was out there for six months
because I didn't have any money to go
anywhere else. So I was basically living
on a tiny little one,
tiny little platform.
There was one other person there who was
like a security guard, like a six year
old British guy, a security guard.
And I arranged to have like an offset
by 12 hour shift from him.
So I would not actually see another
person for like three months at a time
was it was probably not the most
psychologically awesome thing to do,
but I had irises, so that totally made it
better.
Yeah. So there's things that you would
expect from building a data haven that
would be the reasons for failure, and
they actually, in our case, were not
reasons for failure. We don't know that
these things are not reasons for failure
in general, but they were not our reasons
for failure. Maybe we didn't get to them.
Maybe we were lucky.
So legal or regulatory pressure never
actually was an issue at all.
We got some very, very
cursory legal threats type things,
but they were mostly from civil things.
We didn't do anything really bad.
We had a very correctly chosen
for their risk model.
We had acceptable use policy.
So no spam, no child porn,
no hacking other people's servers.
And I think
we added no terrorism on 9/11.
It wasn't really I thought before that.
And that was like the entirety of our
acceptable use policy.
We were sort of in the gray area about
copyright. We also had the benefit that
our cost was so high for servers that you
would not be able to put a file sharing
server on it and have it be profitable.
If we'd had much lower costs, that would
have been an issue.
There was no real competition for a
physical data haven at the time.
There were secure facilities, but there
was no data haven as such,
and no one had a great software
replacement for this kind of thing.
No one hacked us. As far as I know, we
had very little infrastructure ourselves,
so it's unlikely that that got hacked.
Some of our customers might have gotten
hacked, but we wouldn't know.
But there was no like major hacking
incident or anything and there were no
fundamental technical issues here.
Getting bandwidth out to this place would
not have been that hard with like five or
ten million dollars versus two million
dollars, lots
of things like that. So these weren't really
recent failure. But we don't know if
there's these are the things that I'm
much more concerned about are is there an
actual demand for data center, a data
haven type services?
I think there is, but we don't really
know for sure how can you make a viable
product that people will actually be able
to pay for? Like there's plenty of people
who would love to have a server that
could never be shut off.
But are they people who will be able to
pay for that service at the cost
required? And then the biggest
problem with this whole thing is it's
really easy to have like one or two
below the radar.
If you got some services that don't
attract any negative attention, you're
fine until you have like
Lavabit or something hosted on you and
then legal stuff happens.
So basically, the more successful you
get, the higher the odds of some horrible
incident happening and then having to
resist it, which is sort of the opposite
of a lot of other models where the bigger
you get, the easier it is to be
successful. So that's that's a
fundamental thing. And there's a question
of can you do this better in software if
you can ever do something in software
rather than spending money on platforms
and offshore data havens, it's totally
worth it.
And then the other question is, even if
you can do all the stuff, should we do it
like not everything you can do should be
done by people.
I think free speech trumps the other
disincentives to doing those things.
I think data havens should exist, but it
is an open question and people have
different opinions on that.
So we're not the only data here.
And there have been data havens since
then. And based
on the earlier definition, there's
different ones. So I would say that a
conventional great data center,
like a Tier one or whatever facility is
a data haven in terms of keeping your
servers available.
You're subject to the laws in whatever
country you are.
And the nice thing is, like the US has
great laws for certain things.
Ireland, Germany have great laws for
other things and you can pick and choose
your application.
There's a company called the Bunker and
there's a couple other things where
they've taken World War
Cold War bunkers and refitted them
as data centers.
They're in the countries that have
certain laws, so they'll have either UK
law or Swedish law
or Swiss law or the things like that.
But they're nice facilities.
They're generally have weaker network
connectivity than the center of town
data centers like Telehouse Wood.
So there's a trade off there.
There's a bulletproof hosting model.
So there's this whole world of the other.
All we had is no spam.
Speaking of bulletproof hosting, the
response, you URLs that people
go to from Spam get shut
down by people all the time.
Malware, you URLs get shut down all the
time. There's this concept of a
bulletproof host that will stay up
against this kind of attack.
Usually the term bulletproof host is used
specifically around this kind of like
nuisance type stuff versus free speech.
But you could use it in any way.
And there's a famous company in the
Netherlands that was rated has some crazy
stuff. And then there's distributed
software systems and there's application
specific systems that are designed around
redundancy.
So, yeah, this is a
two billion dollar data center in
downtown San Francisco, which is later
got sold for like twenty five million
dollars or something. There were the
generators going out.
This is an awesome facility.
Punin Bonlac Data Center, which I've
never been to, but I'd love to get a
server there someday.
Telehouse, the probably the
premier Internet Interconnection Center
and all of Europe, which is also
great. I used to live like five
blocks away from that place, which I
thought would be awesome. But it's actually
more of a pain to move a server five
blocks than it is to move it like across
town, because you feel bad about taking a
taxi that distance and you can't really
carry it. So that was not a decision.
And this is the bunker. The cyber bunker,
sorry, the cyber bunker.
So there have been successes.
So PAVLENKO not a complete
failure. We did accomplish the goal of
making things popular ised
and things like that. But it was not a
commercial success in any way.
I lost like a quarter of a million
dollars by spending a bunch of money not
getting reimbursed on credit card.
Which is not awesome,
but there have been people who have been
successful Bitcoin, as
far as we can tell so far, like it's not
the finished book, but like it's been a
pretty successful Pirate Bay has been
successful, sort of like they've moved
their servers around and have been
relatively successful.
BitTorrent has been incredibly successful
at keeping things
available, but has not been commercially
terribly successful.
WikiLeaks has remained online despite
doing stuff that the most powerful
governments in the world don't like.
And the really exciting thing they did
was it's insurance file concept.
Silk Road was I guess there's an
asterisk. So was basically successful
technically, except for some user
admin issues or something.
And Tor has been pretty successful,
especially hidden services, which are
valid in this case.
So really, if we so we don't want to just
like blindly do the same thing again, we
want to figure out what went wrong and
fix it.
So how not to fail.
You want to think about your application
model for the technical side of it.
You want to think about who your threats
are and
adversaries. You definitely need to think
about your business model and useful
technologies that can help you.
So as far as application, you want to do
as little hard stuff as possible
ever. You always want to do easy stuff
and you want to make sure it's like the I
guess I could use a zip quote or
something, but you always want to meet
the enemy on the ground where you
control, but your advantage, you don't
want to fight in your weak spot.
So do things that are easy, like
static data is pretty easy to keep
resistent from censorship.
You just make lots of copies and is also
resistant against accidental deletion,
whatever. So if you have a lot of copies,
the cool thing with the insurance file
is, is distributing widely and encrypted
file and then distributing the small key
later because basically they won't censor
it because they can't go back in time.
So it's kind of awesome.
You end up with a lot of general
distributed systems problems.
Do you need to have immediate
consistency, some sort of global lock?
Can you do eventual consistency?
All these things that like computer
scientists deal with and then Web
application developers and application
developers deal with are super relevant
in the data haven world.
And then there's the hardest
thing possible is to build a
legacy so you can't build a custom
client. You have to use like a regular
Web browser, globally synchronized
transaction system.
That is the hardest thing to build.
So if you can build a data haven that
will work with that model, you have one
maybe threats and
adversaries depending on who your
threats are. There's a lot of techniques
you can do and they're different against
different people. If you're worried about
a government in the Middle East,
government in Africa or something else
going after your community, your
global diaspora community for human
rights stuff, put your servers in a place
like Germany or in the United States
because those governments will be happy
to stand up to a dictator, at
least as far as not giving them the
copies of your data.
You can split up across jurisdictions.
I've seen as I did the work in Iraq and
Afghanistan, just doing like satellite
Internet for people. But I got to meet
some of the law enforcement people and
see the trouble they go through when
they're trying to deal with servers.
They're in multiple jurisdictions and a
lot of cases they don't even bother if
it's a particularly difficult
jurisdiction like, say, Eastern Europe.
But if you can make that so it's like the
Russian dolls problem of multiple
servers, they get bored pretty fast
and you can use disposable finance,
which has been sort of the WikiLeaks
model where the pieces that you have
the most of and that you can easily
replace, you make those
pop up. Those are the only things that
are exposed. And then you have servers
and back end your big data repository
processing. That's much harder to
replace. You keep shielded and then you
minimize the bulletproof computing base.
So it's sort of the inverse of a trusted
computing base or sort of related to
trusting, committed base where the parts
that actually need to be resilient
against all these attacks should be as
small as possible for application
laws and politics.
These always change.
I know much more about technology than I
do about laws, but the issue we
had in the nineties was that law wasn't
really settled. We had both.
I mean, there's a concept, at least in
common law, countries like Black Letter
Law and then court law or case
law. There were lots of cases where there
was neither black letter law nor case
law. Now, at least there's case law and a
lot of cases. There's black letter law
about it, but
there wasn't a lot of that stuff back in
the day then.
Well, Saelens was still going on during
terrorism. I woke up, I was like
asleep. I'd gotten like a weird sleep
schedule. So I woke up at local
three p.m. or so, which was like an hour
after the 9/11 World Trade
Center attacks, woke up, saw the
TV of, like, these things crashing in and
thought one that sucks and too
well, they're going to completely ruin
like any possibility of doing offshore
data and stuff.
So I set up anonymous remailer later that
day and a bunch of other stuff, like push
the limits a little bit more.
But it was pretty clear that terrorism
was going to get used to beat down
any form of anonymity, even for things
that are totally unrelated to terrorism.
In the nineties, we had the four horsemen
of child porn, money laundering,
terrorism and tax evasion.
And it's a lot easier to scare people
with terrorism than it is to scare people
with like evil tax evaders or something.
So
so we were afraid of that.
The other thing is you want to have a
preemptive, positive legal campaign if
you are behind the curve and the first
thing anyone hears about you is something
negative, like you're used for child
porn. You have lost no matter if the law
on your side. They'll just change the law
or they'll change the interpretation or
your funding pool or something like that,
you want to make sure that you've got
good stories out there of how you're
helping people
escape horrible situations,
things like that first.
And then you pick some cases that have
really good, good optics.
So you help open source projects.
You help like the overseas diaspora
of a country where the country is
monitoring those people's communications,
things like that. The other key thing,
which I think is these are these are all
fairly obvious.
That one that I thought was the most
useful is pick one known
main adversary, one threat, and make sure
you can defeat that. So in our case, we
could pick something like gambling and we
could be the the awesome place where you
can host your gambling servers.
No one really cared about gambling except
for the US government. And there were
five thousand miles away from us.
So we didn't really have to worry about
them very much. We would not have picked
something that a lot of countries hated
or that the British specifically hated
because they're much closer to us.
So pick one thing to do and just
do that thing rather than like and taking
on every every other country in the
world.
Then there's an open question about
business model. You really want to have a
working business model before you scale
up your business. So keep your costs
low and building something like this so
you can pick a model.
A lot of the problems are the interesting
customers are usually not really
able to pay very much.
The boring customers are slow to move.
So you can get interesting customers with
not a lot of money early on, but
you can't really serve them unless you
either have a lot of money or have very
low costs. And there's that.
The non-intuitive thing is to build a
system that works really, really, really
well for one specific application.
So you could build like anonymous
retailers or one of the most secure, most
effective against very high level threat
systems out there because they only dealt
with email, whereas TOR has a much harder
problem because it deals with arbitrary
protocols or an arbitrary date.
And as more things so you can build a
single application that you know a lot
about, it's pretty easy or relatively
it's much easier, not pretty easy,
and then solve something that's on the
efficient frontier of risk and value.
Don't put like hundreds of millions of
dollars into solving something where
you're only like a tiny bit better
than somebody else either.
Don't spend a lot of money to be a tiny
bit better or
spend a lot of money but be amazingly
awesome at it and then cross subsidize.
If you build a system for your own
application, you might make really
high margins on, say, offering email
addresses and stuff where
the hosting can be higher than it is in
other places because you have less cost
for other things and then hybrid
solutions where you have like a P2P
model, a software system and a data haven
that are working together or things like
that, or an open source thing, or you
have something like fact's where it's not
an objectional application.
You use that to demonstrate your
technology and then build something else
later.
So there's a lot of useful technologies
that didn't really exist in the late 90s
when we're doing the stuff that do exist
now.
Tor one of the more useful tools here.
We have a lot of people to talk about.
There is no point in me talking matau
heavyweight clients.
There was a period in the early 2000s
where it was basically just Web clients.
No one wanted to run local
software on the machine and it was sort
of a JavaScript was at the level where
you could run a real client there.
Two things have killed that model, one
Ajax JavaScript stuff, so you can build a
pretty heavyweight client in a Web
browser. Even that doesn't require
network access.
Even better, you have mobile phones and
things. We can have an actual application.
So we've gotten back to the point where
you can build an application, has local
state, which lets you do much more
interesting protocols and you can build
new protocols. You can build a protocol
that's much more resistant to censorship
than http to a static address.
And I'm a big fan of Messers based
systems rather than Conexion oriented
systems. If your fundamental task is
message based, you can pass these
messages around like in the U.S.
model or the anonymous remailer model
rather than opening a pipe.
It's much more anonymous, much more
secure, much more reliable than that, and
use latency in that kind of situation
here. Advantage, however, there's a bunch
of missing technology. So we still have
not, I would say, solve the anonymous
electronic cash problem.
And Bitcoin is
a decent system, but is not anonymous,
certainly not anonymous against
determined effort to find ARBITRATES
actions not anonymous by default.
So zero coin and some systems like that
might be sufficient.
I'm still a true believer in Chami
and electronic digital blinded cash.
It has a long and kind of
sad history, but I think someone will
eventually do this and I'll be
successful.
I think we also need to reboot the
anonymous remailer network.
I mean, one of the sad things was Len
Sesemann was the main
remailer guy and he's no longer with us.
So we don't have a remailer network that
is as good as it was in like twenty
three. So we need at least get back to
that level and maybe build something
better and then cloud computing you
if you're building on the stuff for Data
Haven and then you've got us is your back
end for your application, it's really
easy to send a subpoena to there or do
whatever else.
Having a trustworthy cloud where the
operator can't modify your computing
would be great. And it's not really cost
effective to have dedicated physical
servers for each machine, especially in
an offshore data haven.
So there's that and then secure client
devices. As we've seen with the Silkroad
example, no matter how great your
server security is, if your client
device is.
Captured, unencrypted, or whatever else,
you've got serious problems.
So, yeah, that's basically
I have a bunch of URLs, this will be up
on the Web somewhere.
A lot of stuff. There's a bunch of
articles, some interesting
legal analysis of this that has been done
by people and that.
So, yeah, data humans have existed in
concept and practice for.
I would I think there's probably examples
in the 50s and 60s, certainly from the
70s and 80s and
genuinely mixed results.
So there's lots of work to do in the
future. I'd be very interested in any
questions or comments or anyone has.
We have about 15 minutes left.
Please use.
So any questions, anyone?
A question from the Internet, in his
opinion, a little out of place does
the unwanted attention, drugs, politics
and poorly supervised business and
data redundancy models like Siyabonga
outweigh the benefits of a data haven?
Please repeat
your opinion, does the unwanted
attention, drugs and politics
and poorly supervised business
and data redundancy models like Cyber
Bunker outweigh the benefits of a
data haven?
Yeah, I think
the the need for a data haven
in nineteen ninety eight was
very, very clear because the laws would
not allow lots of very legitimate
applications in
and September 10th.
Two thousand.
I would probably maybe have answered
the other way that laws in the
US and in Europe were pretty good at the
time.
However, Patriot Act
or IP in the UK, lots of things have been
pushing in the other direction.
So while there are severe negatives
to spam, abusive
use, things like that, I think
actual legitimate free speech use is a
sufficiently at risk that the value of
data havens is, if not
absolute, today.
Yes, there's a very easy
projection where it is.
So I think we need the technology, even
if we use it for the equivalent of
better latency reduction, having
servers close to people, we should build
that and then. Yeah.
Please, if you leave the room now, please
leave silent.
Thank you very much and take your garbage
with you.
Thanks, please.
On a scale from one to 10,
how much bullshit would you say is in the
ecosystem around the
Bitcoin and coin block
and block chain technology
right now and also in the startup world
in general?
Yes, that is a good question.
Ten being the most.
OK, so I think there
is clearly value in both a lot of
the startups and in Bitcoin.
Bitcoin is an awesome solution to
distributed systems problem that
has been open for a long time.
Bitcoin itself as a currency
does not really personally excite me.
I own two point three Bitcoin after
winning a bet about the North Korea
hackers and Sony thing.
So I'm not
I mean, I think it is not the final
system. I don't think Bitcoin as it is
today is going to be the system that does
everything we wanted to do.
But I think some anonymous
electronic payment system or some form of
value will and that might be block chain.
It might be Bitcoin over time.
It might change.
And yeah, there's a lot of hype with
startups, but especially in Silicon
Valley, where it seems like everyone
does it by default. But there's also a
lot of value.
The contrary to that is look look at the
big companies and how much innovation
they have. It seems like they have
outsourced all of the innovation to
startups other than by.
So maybe it's a fundamental shift in how
business works. But, yeah, there's a lot
there's there's a lot of good and a lot
of bad. And we don't really know.
I think maybe maybe there's another
axis like an axis or something here,
but yeah, yeah.
Have you considered the benefits of
distributing a decentralized
conflict set up just like the Pirate Bay
did while the servers were
taken down from everywhere they popped
up? Because I
think that superior
states like the United States, they would
just like Zealand if it was
just a great threat to the geopolitical
agenda, if it didn't have public support
and military to back it up.
Yeah, absolutely.
The level of protection you can get
from a physical location is
up to how angry you make people
that have the ability to bomb you
hosting gambling servers.
We never would have gotten to that point.
Our most objective, the weirdest thing
that I learned was that there's a lot of
stuff that's legal and like set of
country and then a lot of stuff.
It's legal instead of country B, but then
there's like the combination of that.
I guess I can talk about that now.
But like we had a customer that did this
weird bidding or betting
on porn images.
So porn in countries that are
OK with gambling is usually bad.
So there were very few countries that had
both porn and gambling being OK.
You'd bet on which of six softcore images
would be popular, the most popular among
the people that week.
And you would then
win if it was the most popular thing,
which is actually pretty awesome, I think
would be a fun thing to recreate.
But they couldn't find an
acceptable gaming jurisdiction and
an acceptable porn jurisdiction.
That was all in one. But no one's going
to be famous for that. So, yeah.
Yeah, I agree that the people like
WikiLeaks, I am certain that if the
US government could quietly kill
the people involved in WikiLeaks and not
get caught for it or not be attributable,
it would have happened. So the only thing
that kept people alive and successful was
being distributed. And that sort of
system that is the most resistant system
against a large that like that or finding
a counterweight nation state or something
like going to Russia is the solution.
They're not going to go to war with
Russia over Snowden, but they would have
potentially done more pressure against my
country. So there's a crazy
geopolitical thing involved.
But yeah, software crypto that night.
I think the thing that got me interested
in crypto when I was like 11 or 12
years old was knowing that I
was like in a house in a
suburban house. And I had like very
little resources. I could do something
that no one could undo.
Like cryptographically the computing
power on my machine was enough that with
the right algorithm, you couldn't decrypt
it, even if you had all the resources of
everyone that would ever exist in any
part of the universe. So that is a really
awesome concept.
And if you can use that to your
advantage, you go for it.
But there's a lot of things you can't do
that transaction systems make it much
harder to.
It seems like in a way to avoid and
services has achieved some of what
you intended to achieve with a haven.
So do you see any other
practical alternatives to Tauhid and
services right now or things coming up
that might be better than to wait and
services yet?
Tor Hidden Services is
a great system within
the security parameters of the Tor
network. I think if you had a
sufficiently dangerous application
posted on a service or if you made a
mistake, you could compromise the entire
system. TOR is not designed to resist a
really determined, active global
adversary and that is the
adversary that we face.
They're willing to modify packets,
they're willing to do whatever. So I
don't think you could run a long running
tor hidden service with a Tor network as
it is today, with
something that the US government really,
really, really cared about defeating to
the point where they would break arbitrary
laws for like if the location
of Osama bin Laden had been discoverable
by defeating all of Tor
in 2005 or so,
it would have been defeated.
So that's a partially
a problem with the system as part of the
problem of scale. But I think there
are systems that you could build with
feasible resources that would resist that
threat. I think the systems that would be
the easiest to build the most principle
are message based systems like anonymous
remailer.
Tim may have this awesome thing,
black net back in like the mid
90s where you would send
anonymous mail to anonymous remailer.
It would then wait like a week or so and
do some operation on an email, you back a
response or send it to a Usenet posting
group that's much more secure against a
global passive or global global active
adversary, then a connection orated
system with connection systems.
You can just do crazy stuff like if you
think someone is the the list,
like ten thousand people that are
possible candidates, you look at their
travel patterns, you arrest like ten of
them. If you thought of their high probability,
you see if a service goes offline, you go
after servers individually.
There's lots of stuff you can do if
you're willing to be a bad person to
uncover important services.
But it's an awesome system and it's like
the it's the best practical
thing we have today.
It's pleas from the Internet.
Yes, there's a question, uh, could an
established multinational company
theoretically build a data haven within
itself currently?
Yes, so and multinational
organizations often do have things
that are very close to date havens, like
I think I've done a lot of computer
security stuff over the past two decades.
There's a crazy fact of like if you're a
regulated industry that has to meet a
certain security objective, like a
government contractor, a government
entity, somebody who has
some external regulation, you will meet
that regulation, but you won't go any
beyond that regulation.
The people who have like an open ended
liability if their things are
compromised, do actually in some cases an
exceptionally good job of security.
Pharma companies doing drug discovery
work where the molecule is like the most
secret thing in the world for them.
They have actually good security
proprietary trading firms.
They keep their algorithms relatively
secure against like compared
to what I would say any government agency
has done. So there
are organizations that do
a pretty good job of this.
Usually those are those are usually
static data hosting systems, not
transaction processing systems.
And they're for internal use.
It's a much easier model because you
don't really have to worry about
censorship or denial of service,
attack or other action.
You just need to keep integrity and
operation. But yeah, corporations
internally can build very secure systems.
However, most corporations, as everyone
is aware, have pretty horrible internal
systems.
OK.
One question.
Is there any system you would recommend
to watch out for in the future,
Zucco is working on zero point
zero cash. Well, I think that's public.
I hope that's the thing.
And I'm personally the most excited about
there's.
Yeah, I think that's the most exciting
system tour, HP will
continue development.
I think they have to they're on a curve
that is not going to get to where you
really need to be for data haven unless
they dramatically
change or improve.
I think there needs to be some
improvement and change.
Part of that is coming up with legitimate
applications. So if if
horrible governments get elected, US,
Europe, everywhere else, such that the
need for data havens is increased
and more people see it as a mainstream
thing that we have to have, we'll get
great data.
However, we'll live in a world that has
really shitty US and European governments
where people get like abducted and killed
in all sorts of stuff like that.
It's not really a trade off at once.
So what we really want is a data haven
that's really secure in an environment
where you don't really need them.
And that's sort of a fundamental quandary
of if you don't need it, what no one's
going to spend the money doing it.
You're the best people in the world
aren't going to work on it. They're going to
work on something like delivering
faster traffic rather than more secure
traffic. So, yeah.
OK, one last question from the Internet.
Is there a data haven, do it yourself,
how to online? If not, would you like to
put online? And is there a data haven
software as a service?
Yes, there
is not a good document for this I'm
working on, I bought a couple of cabinets
of space and I'm building out what I
think the best way to build hosting
and just sort of like best practice
for that will be I'll document all that
and put it up.
But until we get a
virtualization platform that can do
remote attestations.
So I have this company before
I joined CloudFlare Crypto SEAL
that was doing cloud computing
where you could remotely attest to the
integrity of the container and the VM and
everything else. There was no market for
it. It was very hard to build.
Private Core, which got the Facebook, was
working on very similar stuff
until we have better hardware
platforms, until SGX is a start, but
a lot of other stuff, we aren't gonna be
able to build a virtual virtualize
platform that is secure enough for this
kind of stuff. And without that, it's
going to be very hard to make this
commercially viable if you have to use
dedicated hardware for every single
customer. It'll be pretty challenging.
So, yeah, maybe.
OK, thank you, Ron.
OK, for all the others to please, please
take your garbage with you and
we will continue in 15 minutes, memory
corruption, why can't we have nice
things?